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A. Statement of the Issue
This paper addresses two major issues arising out of the
current war between Iran and Iraq: (1) whether the missile
attacks carried out by each belligerent against neutral shipping
is consistent with international law; and (2) whether the Iranian
visit and search operations conducted onboard neutral vessels
transiting the Persian Gulf are consistent with international
law.
B. Scope of the Inquiry
The law of armed conflict concerns the lawfulness of resorting
to war (which is generally prohibited by the United Nations
Charter )1 as well as the conduct of warfare (which is permitted
under the rubric of individual or collective self-defense ). ^
This paper is concerned with the latter as applied to particular
aspects of the Iran-Iraq conflict. Questions regarding legal
responsibility for starting the war as well as issues such as
the use of chemical weapons or the treatment of prisoners are
not considered.
No attempt is made to assess the merits of particular attacks
against or visits on neutral ships. Rather, this analysis focuses
on the general methods employed by the participants. For instance,
lu.N. Charter arts. 1, 2(3)-(4).
2id. at art. 51.

Iraqi attacks have -- in addition to those against neutral ships
in the exclusion zone -- included attacks outside the exclusion
zone, attacks against Iranian vessels and vessels of mistaken
identity, and mining waterways. These incidents and activities
are outside the scope of this analysis.-^
C. Basic Principles Concerning the Law of Armed Conflict
The two underlying principles of the law of armed conflict
are military necessity and humanity. ^ Broadly stated, military
necessity refers to the justifiable application of any amount
of force needed to overpower an enemy. This principle has been
interpreted narrowly in the U.S. Armed Forces to allow "that
degree and kind of regulated force, not otherwise prohibited
by the laws of war, required for the partial or complete submission
of the enemy with the least possible expenditure of time, life,
and physical resources. "^
The principle of military necessity limits lawful violence
to that needed for the accomplishment of lawful military objec-
^Recently, Iraqi attacks outside the war zone have increased.
Capitalizing on long-range aircraft , Iraq has attacked neutral
ships in the vicinity of Sirri Island and the Strait of Hormuz.
See Washington Post, Aug. 21, 1986, at A22.
^2L. Oppenheim, International Law: Disputes , War and Neutrality
sec. 67 (H. Lauterpacht 7"^^' ed. 1952 ) [hereinafter cited as
2 Oppenheim-Lauterpacht ]
.
^Dep't of the Navy, Chief of Naval Operations, Law of Naval
Warfare, NWIP 10-2 , sec. 220 (1955) ( footnotes omitted) [hereinafter
cited as Law of Naval Warfare ] . See also Dep't of the Air Force,
Judge Advocate General, Commander s Handbook on the Law of Armed
conflict in AFP 110-34
,
paras. 1-1, 2-1, 2-2 (25 July 1980)




tives. As a practical matter, this principle is imprecise
given the uncertain definition of "lawful" objectives and the
ambiguities of human conduct and intentions. ^ Two related concepts
aid -- but do not solve the problem of -- determining what is
lawful force: relevance and proportionality.^ Relevancy refers
to the relationship between the destruction and the objective;
proportionality refers to the level of destruction relative
to the military value of the objective.
8
The principle of humanity "prohibits the employment of
any kind or degree of force not necessary for the purpose of
war, i.e., for the partial or complete submission of the enemy.... "^
This principle is consistent with and complementary to that
of military necessity. ^0 Each principle serves to recognize
the legitimate aims of war while preventing unnecessary destruction
of human and material values. ^-^
This analysis of the attacks and visits on neutral shipping
are applied in the context of these principles. The issue is
whether the particular methods examined comport with the requirements
of these basic concepts. Does attacking neutral vessels constitute
a legitimate military objective for Iran and Iraq? Are the





^Law of Naval Warfare , supra note 5, at sec. 220(b) (footnote
omitted); see also 2 Oppenheim-Lauterpacht , supra note 4, at
sec. 67 (discussing the humanity principle).
^Ow. Mallison, Studies in the Law of Naval Warfare: Submarines
in General and Limited War"! in U.S. Naval War College, Int'l
Law Studies, 1966 16-19 (1968) [hereinafter cited as StudiesT!
^M. McDougal & F. Feliciano, supra note 6, at 522-523.

visit and search procedures employed by Iran appropriate under
the circumstances?
D. Organization
A juridicial analysis of a practice or method of coercion
under the law of armed conflict involves considering several
factors: first, the factual context of the method; second,
the historical development of the method and the customary rules
which purport to regulate the method; and lastly, the contemporary
context of usage which should be considered if international
law is to adapt to the changing conditions of warfare and remain
relevant to modern-day needs of maintaining minimum world order.
Accordingly, this analysis is organized as follows: first,
a review of the war's origins and the belligerents' military
capabilities and objectives; second, a chronology of major
developments surrounding the tanker war in the Persian Gulf;
third, an overview of the traditional or customary law concerning
neutral rights, contraband control, visit and search, blockades,
and exclusion zones; and finally, an analysis of the attacks
against and searches of shipping in light of the customary law
and other contextual factors which take into account the circum-
stances surrounding the Iran-Iraq War.

II . Overview of the Iran-Iraq War
A. Origins of the War
The Iran-Iraq War began ostensibly out of an old boundary
dispute over the Shatt al-Arab, an estuary extending north from
the Persian Gulf to where the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers converge.
Underlying this dispute are other territorial issues concerning
the northern border areas and some islands in the Persian Gulf,
along with long-standing ethnic, religious, and political animosities
which have characterized Iraqi-Iranian relations for centuries.
However, the most dramatic aspect of the dispute centers
on the Shatt al-Arab which forms a fifty-mile border between
Iran and Iraq. This estuary is of strategic and commercial
importance to both countries. It provides Iraq with its only
port on the Persian Gulf^^ g^Yl^ Iran maritime access for its
oil refinery at Abadan and the port of Khorramshahr . ^^
Conflict over the Shatt al-Arab dates back a millenium.
Over time numerous conferences, surveys, and demarcations have
l^iraq has two major ports on to the Persian Gulf: Basra
(which is located toward the northern end of the Shatt) and
the Fao Peninsula (located to the west of the Shatt al-Arab).
See M. Khadduri & H. Dixon, Passage Through International Waterways
in Major Middle Eastern Problems in International Law 65, 88
(M. Khadduri ed. 1972) (discussing the strategic importance
of the waterway for Iraq).
^^I^. at 89. Other major Iranian ports include Bandar Khomeini
and Bandar Mahshahr (at the northern end of the Persian Gulf),
also Bushehr (about 100 miles further south of Bandar Mahshahr),
Kharg Island (off the coast of Iran), and Bandar Abbas. See
also S. Grummon, The Iran-Iraq War -- Islam Embattled 3-6 (The
Washington Papers No. 92 1982). (detailing the relative signifi-
cance of the Shatt al-Arab for Iran and Iraq).

to define and redefine the boundary. An agreement was concluded
at Zuhab in 1639, which, inter alia , addressed the boundary. l'^
This produced no permanent agreement. The Treaty of Erzurum
(1847) gave Abadan and Khorramshahr to Iran (which was then
called Persia) along with guaranteed access to the Gulf through
the Shatt al-Arab; sovereignty over the Shatt al-Arab went to
Iraq (which was then part of the Ottoman Empire). ^^
Later, Russia and Great Britain attempted to mediate a
permanent settlement. A 1913 Protocol and 1914 Delimitation
Commission affirmed Ottoman sovereignty over the entire Shatt
al-Arab. 16 Persia subsequently contested this, seeking a boundary
down the middle (thalweg) of the waterway. In yet another treaty,
concluded in 1937, Persia gained control of the waterway up
to the thalweg in the Abadan area.^^ Differences continued,
however, and in 1969 Iran repudiated the 1937 treaty and seized
control of the entire length of Shatt al-Arab up to the thalweg. ^^
In 1975, the Algerian Government mediated a treaty under-
which the thalweg was recognized as the boundary for the entire
l^C. Helms, Iraq: Eastern Flank of the Arab World 143 (1984).
l^Lauterpacht , River Boundaries: Legal Aspects of the Shatt
al-Arab Frontier , 9 Int 1 & Comp. L.Q. 208-36 (1960) (providing
historical background to the border dispute).
l^See M. Khadduri & H. Dixon, supra note 12, at 90.
I'^Boundary Treaty, July 4, 1937, Irak-Iran, 190 L.N.T.S. 256.
l^seeM. Khadduri S(H. Dixon, supra note 12, at 91-92; C. Helms,
supra note 14, at 144.

Shatt al-Arab.l9
Two other territorial aspects are part of the underlying
disputes: the central border region and the Iraqi demand for
the return of several islands in the southern Gulf to Arab
sovereignty . 20
A second dimension to the dispute is the cultural and
religious differences between the two nations. Iran is made
up primarily of Persians who are predominately Shiite Muslims;
Iraq consists mainly of Arabs and is ruled by Sunni Muslims. ^1
The presence of approximately seven million Shiites (many of
Persian dissent) in Iraq has been a source of unrest and friction
between the two states. For instance, Iraq has long seen Iran
as a propagator of Kurdish and Shia unrest in Iraq; Iran, on
the other hand, has held Iraq responsible for agitating unrest
19 See C. Helms, supra note 14, at 149-150 (explaining also
the political pressures on the parties for concluding the agreement)
;
S. Grummon, supra note 13, at 10; Iraq's Baath Party considered
this agreement an humiliation -- it was a product of duress
since Iran held the upper hand militarily and was actively supporting
Kurdish autonomy in northern Iraq. As a quid pro quo for ceasing
their support of the Kurds, Iraq conceded Iranian sovereignty
over the Shatt al-Arab up to the thalweg.
20 See C. Helms, supra note 14, at 144-4 5, 147-48, 164 (discussing
the central border and island issues).
2lDif ferences between Sunni and Shiite Muslims date back
to beginning of Islam in the seventh century A.D.; the basis
for the schism lies in their differing views over who should
rightfully lead the Islamic community. For a discussion on
how the two sects have co-existed in Iraq, see C. Helms, supra
note 14, at 141-42.

among Iranian Arabs in Kurdistan. ^2
A third dimension to the causes of the conflict which overlaps
the cultural and religious differences are the political ideologies
of the two governments. Iraq is ruled by the Baath Party lead
by Saddam Hussein; it is a secular regime which espouses pan-Arab
nationalism and socialism. 23 since 1945, Iraq's ideology has
competed with the status quo of the conservative monarchies. 24
The rivalry carried over with the fall of the Shah and the rise
of Islamic fundamentalism in Iran. Ayatolluh Khomeini's regime
has shifted the schism to one of secularism versus traditional
Islamic dogma. Khomeini's regime claims to be based on the
teachings of the Qur'an, clerical leadership, and Islamic inter-
nationalism, i.e., the spread of the Islamic revolution throughout
the Muslim world. 25
Animosity between Iraq and the new Iranian government was
evident from the beginning. Khomeini has taken a provocative
and inflammatory position toward Arab nationalism in general
^^c. Helms, supra note 14, at 153-57; S. Grummon, supra note
13, at 12. These differences were ostensibly settled--to some
extent--in the 1975 Treaty wherein each agreed not to interfere
in the other's internal affairs. However, Iran renewed its
support of subversion in Iraq after the 1978-79 revolution.
C. Helms, supra note 14, at 139-41.
2-^C. Helms, supra note 14, at 103-25.
^^ See id . at 130-41; S. Grummon, supra note 13, at 7-8.
Up until 1978-79, the Shah of Iran was instrumental in main-
taining the status quo.
^^ See generally D. Pipes, In the Path of God (1983) (providing
historical background and a contemporary analysis of Islamic
fundamentalism as a political-religious movement ) . For a discussion
of Ayatolluh Khomeini's objectives in Iran, see id. at 27, 216-17;
R. Ramazani, Khumayni's Islam in Iran's Foreign Policy in Islam
in Foreign Policy 16-20 ( Adeed Dawisha ed. 1983).
8

and toward Hussein in part icular . 26 Likewise, Hussein has indicated
the incompatabi li ty between the pan-Arab movement and Iran's
fundamentalists. In 1979, he stated: "[I]n order for the Islamic
revolution to be Islamic, it must be a friend of the Arab revolu-
tion. Any contradiction between a revolution which calls itself
Islamic and the Arab revolution means that that revolution is
not Islamic. "27 with Khomeini's ascendence to power, the stage
was set for conflict.
By the summer of 1980, tensions increased. Iraq accused
Iran of not abiding by its obligations under the 1975 Treaty. 28
Border hostilities initiated by both sides ensued. 29 on September
17, Iraq formally abrogated the 1975 Treaty. ^0 On September
22, Iraq launched a large-scale attack into southwestern Iran.-^^
26interview with Khomeini at Qum (appearing in the Lebanese
newspaper, Jumhuri-yi Islami, on Jan. 2, 1980), reprinted in
Islam and Revolution -- Writings and Declarations of Imam Khomeini
329, 332 (H. Algar ed. and trans. 1981); see also C. Helms,
supra note 14, at 159-60 (describing Khomeini s basic attitudes
towards and ideological distinctions with Hussein and the Baath
Party); Helms, The Iraqi Dilemma , Journal of American-Arab Affairs,
Summer 1983, at 154 (discussing Khomeini's call for the overthrow
of the Baath Party).
2'7Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), Daily Report:
MEA, Oct. 17, 1979, at E4, quoted in C. Helms, supra note 14,
at 159.
28(3^ Helms, supra note 14, at 163.
29^. at 163; S. Grummon, supra note 13, at 12-14.
30 Id.
3^See supra note 29; see also Daly, The Enduring Gulf War ,
U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, May 1985, at 148, 153 (providing
a short description of the early stages of the war). Iraq may
claim that it acted in self-defense in response to Iranian
cross-border attacks.

B. Iraqi War Aims and Assumptions
Iraq's initial objectives included: reasserting sovereignty
over the Shatt al-Arab; obtaining the return of several islands
(located near the Strait of Hormuz) to Arab sovereignty; obtaining
self-rule for Arabs living in Khuzestan Province (which borders
the Shatt al-Arab); and preventing further Iranian interference
in its internal affairs. ^2 p^ more comprehensive objective emerged
when Iran began conducting counterof fensives . ^3 one observer
comments:
As the war continued. .. statements related strictly
to Iraqi territorial claims receded and a deeper concern
...came to surface and become paramount: the specter
of an Islamic government dominated by Khomeini .... [T]he
Iraqi Ba'thists sought to discredit or encourage the
overthrow of the Islamic revolutionaries in Iran and
thus lessen the political threat posed by their ideology.
An important objective was to deliver a blow sufficient
to dissuade Iran from interferring in internal Iraqi
affairs. 34
Certain assumptions lead the Iraqi leadership to believe
that their goals were attainable through a short decisive opera-
^^Daly, supra note 31, at 152 (referring to official Iraqi
pronouncements); C. Helms, supra note 14, at 164; Evans & Campany,
Iran-Iraq: Bloody Tomorrows , U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings,
Jan. 1985, at 34-35 (pointing out that Khuzestan Province —
the area invaded by Iraq — contains valuable oil reserves).
^^See C. Helms, supra note 14 at 164; S. Grummon, supra note
13, at 15-16. This aim has apparently receded in light of the
Iraq's willingness to negotiate a settlement. See infra note
66. However, logically Iraq remains concerned with the continued
existance of the Islamic Republic in light of Khoemini's avowed
goal of forcing the overthrow of Hussein's regime. See supra
note 26.
34c. Helms, supra note 14, at 164; see [1982] 28 Keesing's
Contemporary Archives 31519, quoting an Iraqi official as saying





The Iraqi's believed that Iran's military had been fatally
damaged by the revolution and that Iran's leadership was divided. ^^
They also thought that the Iranian population did not support
the revolution and that Iran's political ideology would alienate
other Arab states. ^"7
C. Iran's Objectives and Responses to the Iraqi Attack
Iran's objectives have remained essentially the same throughout
the conflict. The initial objective was to repel the Iraqi
incursion. 38 g^t Iran also sought a comprehensive political
victory over Iraq which includes: the removal of Hussein and
the Baath Party, an admission of aggression, reparations, and
repatriation of Shiite Arabs. ^^ The demand for Hussein's removal
is non-negotiable . ^0
The Iraqi's miscalculated the response of Iran's military
and the resilience of its r evolution . ^^ The initial attack
did not exploit Iran's weaknesses. Rather, it permitted Iran's
^^Daly, supra note 31, at 152; S. Grummon, supra note 13,
at 17-18.
36c. Helms, supra note 14, at 165-66; Daly, supra note 31,
at 152; S. Grummon, supra note 13, at 9.
3
'See supra note 36.
^^Daly, supra note 31, at 152.
39id. Iraq previously expelled some 90,000 Shiites of Iranian
origin. C. Helms, supra note 14, at 145-46.
^Ooaly, supra note 31, at 153; Sick, How Iran is Becoming
the Gulf's Superpower , Washington Post, May 8, 1986, at Fl,
col. 1.
^^ See generally C. Helms, supra note 14, at 171-75 (outlining





armed forces to regain credibility and revitalize its operational
capacity. ^^2 iraq also helped consolidate Khomeini's authority
by providing a rallying point for popular support. ^^
D. The Military Forces of Iran and Iraq -- Conduct of
the War
Iran's strength lies in its geographic size, large population,
and the motivation of its people, many of whom are driven by
revolutionary and religious fervor that enables Iran to sustain
heavy losses and still continue a war of attrition. ^^ Addition-
ally, despite enormous costs, Iran has supported its war by exporting
oil, maintaining foreign currency reserves, and avoiding disabling
debts. 45
Iran has a sizeable armed force, but lacks sophisticated
weaponry. At the outbreak of the war, Iran's forces numbered
approximately 240,000; it had 450 aircraft but only 30-40% were
4^ See Evans & Campany, supra note 32, at 36-37; Speedhar,
The Gulf — Scramble for Security 35-36 (1983).
"^^ See supra note 40l sT Bakhash, Reign of the Ayatolluhs
129 (1984); C. Bernard & Z. Khalilzad, The Government of God
182-85 (1985).
44see C. Helms, supra note 14, at 173; Evans & Campany, supra
note 32, at 37-38, [1986] 46 Facts on File No. 2366, Mar. 28,
at 207-2D-G.
45 see [1982] 28 Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 31520-22
(providing a summary of Iran's budget and finances during the
first six months of the war); see also [1984] 44 Facts on File
No. 2262, Mar. 23, at 201-lG (providing a summary of Iran's
annual defense expenditures); Speedhar, supra note 42, at 37-39
(providing a brief assessment of Iran s military potential).
In August 1985, Iran reportedly still produced about 2 million
barrels of oil per day (mbd), 1.6 mbd of that was exported.
[1985] Facts on File No. 2335, Aug. 23, at 619-3C.
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operational.^^ In early 1984, estimates showed Iran having
2.2 million in its armed forces (1 million of which were ground
troops ).4'7 Its forces are highly motivated and view martyrdom
for the cause of Iran and its revolution as a means to paradise. 48
At the same time Iran was estimated to have only 70 aircraft. ^^
Of all the armed services, Iran's navy is the smallest in terms
of manpower and equipment. ^0
Iraq is smaller in geographic size and population . ^1 At
the outbreak of the war its economy was stronger; it was the
world's second largest oil exporter and had a sound economic
infrastructure. ^2
In 1980, Iraq's armed forces were approximately the same
size as Iran's (240,000).^^ Iraq had a significant advantage
in sophisticated weaponry. ^^ By 1984, however, estimates showed
Iraq's economy under considerable strain; its defense expenditures
were about the same as Iran's, but it was in debt; Iraq's economy
was contracting at a rate of 10% per year; moreover, there was
46[i981] 27 Keesing's Contemporary Archives 31005, 31006
(providing a detailed breakdown of Iran's military situation
and strength in September 1980 -- estimates provided by the
Institute of Strategic Studies in London). Iran's population
is estimated at 40 million. Id .
47[1984] 44 Facts on File No. 2262, Mar. 23, at 201-lC-lG.
48Evans & Campany, supra note 31, at 37-38.
^^See supra note 47.
^^Speedhar, supra note 42, at 39.
^^Iraq's population is estimated at 14 million and its geo-




54[1982] 28 Keesing's Contemporary Archives 31522.
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heavy reliance on assistance from European and Gulf states. 55
Iraq's ground troops were estimated at less than one-half million. 56
However, in military equipment -- particularly aircraft and
missile systems -- Iraq continued to have a clear advantage. 57
Iraq's forces have steadfastly defended their territory
against Iranian advance, but morale and growing war weariness
have been and remain a problem for the Iraqi leadership. Their
troops are less willing then their Iranian counterparts to expose
themselves to the enemy. Iran's relative strength in manpower
has caused Iraq's military strategy to favor use of its advanced
weapons over its ground forces. 58
The war began with Iraq crossing the Shatt al-Arab into
Khuzestan Province. 59 Iraq occupied Khorramshahr and laid siege
55see [1984] 44 Facts on File No. 2262, Mar. 23, at 201-1C-2A
(estimates are provided by- the Institute for Strategic Studies
in London); see also Staff of Senate Committee on Foreign Relations,
98th Cong., 2^ Sess., War in the Gulf 24-26 (Comm. Print. 1984)
[hereinafter cited as Committee Print - War in the Gulf). This
Senate staff report described Iraq as being in "serious but
manageable shape"; it notes also growing domestic political
problems in Iraq. j[d. For a current assessment of economic
conditions in Iran and Iraq, see Washington Post, Mar. 6, 1986,
at A25 (suggesting that Iran remains better able to withstand
long-term economic stress, whereas Iraq has had to sustain its
population on an artificial economy buoyed by foreign assistance).
56[1984] Facts on File No. 2262, Mar. 23, at 201-lC-lG.
571^. See also Committee Print - War in the Gulf, supra
note 55, at 12 (providing a detailed summary of the military
balance, including relative numbers of aircraft, tanks, artillery,
naval combatants and border troops).
58 see Committee Print - War in the Gulf, supra note 55, at
24; Sick, supra note 40, at FA, col. 4; [1986] 46 Facts on File
No. 2366, Mar. 28, at 207-2D-F. As the stalemate continues,
some look for this tendency to grow within the Iraqi ranks.
See Time Mag., Mar. 3, 1986, at 50.




to Abadan.^0 Iran responded with stiff resistance to Iraq's
advances and with counterattacks on economic targets such as
Iraq's oil exporting facilities at Basra and Fao.^-'-
In 1981-82, Iran launched major counterof fensives and by
May 1982 recaptured Khorramshahr and by June 1982 forced Iraq
to withdraw from Iranian territory alt ogether . ^2 gy the end
of 1982, Iran advanced into Iraqi territory. Iraq responded
by increasing attacks on cities and oil installations . ^^ By
1983, a war of attrition was underway and continued into 1984
with no significant gains by either side.^^
In early 1984, Iraq was on the defensive and looking for
ways to break the deadlock. Several strategies emerged;- using
chemical weapons, purchasing new armaments (primarily French-built
Super Entendard aircraft and Exocet missiles), constructing
extensive fortifications, and increasing air-launched attacks
on Iranian economic targets (including oil exporting facilities
^^Daly, supra note 31, at 152.
6lEvans & Campany, supra note 32, at 37-38; see generally
[1981] 27 Keesing's Contemporary Archives 31006-09 (detailing
military events during the first year of the conflict).
62Evans & Campany, supra note 32, at 38; see generally [1982]
28 Keesing's Contemporary Archives 31517-18, 31848-50 (detailing
military events during the second year of the conflict).
^^[1982] 28 Keesing's Contemporary Archives 31850.
^'^Daly, supra note 21, at 154; Helms, supra note 14, at 166-75
(assessing Iraq s strategy and miscalculations).
15

and shipping). 65 Iraq also pursued a negotiated settlement,
however, Iran has rejected such efforts — unless Hussein is
willing to step down.^^
As the conflict continues into 1986 Iraq is seen as a slow,
steady loser. ^^ Iran has steadily gained the military inititive
and has better sustained its war-making capacity. ^^ On the
ground, Iran has gained a foothold in the Fao Peninsula. ^^ In
the Persian Gulf, Iran has stepped up its attacks against and
visits on neutral merchant ships. ^0 Nevertheless, no clear
outcome is in sight. "^^
^^ See Evans & Campany, supra note 32, at 38; Daly, supra
note 31, at 155-58. These strategies did not begin in 1984,
rather they evolved from the early stages of the conflict and
intensified as the Iraqi's became increasingly defensive. [1982]
28 Keesing's Contemporary Archives 31517-19, 31522, 31948-50,
see [1983] 29 Keesing's Contemporary Archives No. 12, 32594-95;
[1985] 31 Keesing 's Contemporary Archives No. 4, 33560-61 (describing
Iranian offensives during 1983-84 and Iraqi missile attacks
using French Entendard aircraft and Exocet missiles); [1984]
44 Facts on File No. 2262, Mar. 23, at 200-1G-2G (describing
Iranian charges and U.S. statements on alleged use of chemical
weapons by Iraq)
.
^^ See supra note 40 and accompanying text; [1985] 45 Facts
on File No. 2235, Aug. 23, at 62-lF; Committee Print - War in
the Gulf, supra note 55, at 5, 9.
^^ see [1986] 46 Facts on File, No. 2366, Mar. 28, at 1E-2G;
Time, Mar. 3, 1986, at 50.
6Q see supra notes 55 and 67; see also Sick, supra note 40,
at F4, cols. 1-5 (describing developments in Iranian strategy
toward more thorough preparation, smaller probing attacks, and
guerrilla tactics).
6^See supra note 67.
"^Q
see N.Y. Times, May 18, 1986, at sec. 1, pt . 1, at 17,
at col. 1.
"^^ See Time Mag., Mar. 3, 1986, at 50.
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The human cost of the war has been enormous. Estimates
in mid-1985 put Iranian dead between 420,000 to 580,000 and
Iraqi dead at 300, 000. "72
^2n.y. Times, Sept. 23, 1985, A, at 4, col. 3. Losses have
continued to be heavy for both sides into 1986, see Time Mag.,
Mar. 3, 1986, at 50.
17

Ill . The Tanker War
A. The Role of Economic Warfare in the Iran-Iraq War
A significant feature of the Iran-Iraq War is the emphasis
placed on economic targets. The purpose behind such attacks
is to undermine the enemy's ability to finance the war.^^ The
attractiveness of economic targets is heightened by the dependence
of each belligerent on oil exports and the vulnerability of
oil-related targets. "^^ Iraq's marine and pipeline export facilities
are vulnerable . ^^ On the Iranian side, its marine export facilities,
refineries, and logistical support facilities also provide tempting
targets . ^^
From the first weeks of the war, these targets have been
attacked. 77 The cost has been greatest for Iraq. Its export
capability through the Gulf was shutdown and its overland routes
hampered. 78 consequently, Iraq's economy has suffered. 79 con-
versely, Iran's economy suffered little during the early stages
73stauffer, Economic Warfare in the Gulf , American-Arab Affairs
No. 14, Fall 1985, at 98. The tactics of furthering this objective
include: interdiction of critical imports, destruction of oil
export facilities; interruption of transit routes, and attacks
on oil refineries. Id .
74i_d. at 99-100, 103-04; see also Washington Post, Mar. 6,
1986, at A25 (asserting that the relative economic health of
the belligerents will ultimately decide the outcome of the war).
75id. at 100-01.
76id. at 102-03.
77id. at 103-04; see supra notes 62-66 and accompanying text.
78stauffer, supra note 73, at 104-05; see supra note 77.
79 see Washington Post, Mar. 6, 1986, at A25.
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of the war. 30
Starting in 1984, economic warfare began to escalate.
Neutral merchant ships in the Persian Gulf became frequent targets.
Iraq sought to cut-off Iran's oil trade which travels out the
Persian Gulf. Iran has attempted to respond in kind, but to
do so has had to target ships going to and from the various
Gulf states. 81
B. The Attacks on Persian Gulf Shipping
(1) Iraqi Practice
Iraq's war against Gulf shipping has occurred in two stages:
first, attacks were conducted in the northern-most end of the
Gulf near the ports of Bandar Khomeini and Bandar Manshahr.82
During this stage (which lasted until February 1984), attacks
outside the vicinity of these ports were few and incidental
to attacks on other targets. ^^ The second stage commenced with
the blockade of Kharg Island whereupon Iraqi attacks spread
out to include ships going to and from the Kharg Island facility. ^^
(A partial list of the attacks on shipping from 1981 through
^^iran's economy had already been damaged by the revolution
and the socio-political make-up of the populace allowed Iran
to adapt easier to the necessary economic sacrifices of the
war. Stauffer, supra note 73, at 105-06.
^^For a brief review of the early stages of the tanker war,
see Stauffer, supra note 73, at 13-14; Danzinger, The Persian
Gulf Tanker War , U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, May 1985,
at 160.






1984 is set out at Appendix I.)^^ Most Iraqi attacks have occurred
inside a declared exclusion zone and against ships going to
or from Iranian oil port f aci li t ies . ^^ Overall, since 1984
attacks on shipping by Iraq have averaged one or two per week,^^
although this rate has not been maintained consistently . ^^
(2) Iranian Practice
Iran has responded in kind to Iraqi attacks on its shipping.
Concerted attacks by Iran began in 1984. However, because Iran
has effectively shutdown Iraqi marine export facilities, Iran's
only targets were related to other Gulf states' shipping activities,
principally those of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. ^^
^^Appendix I is taken from the Danzinger article, see id .
at 164-67. Dr. Danzinger states that the information is taken
from various news media and is not a exhaustive listing. For
more examples of reported attacks by Iraq, see N.Y. Times, Jan. 12,
1985, sec. 1, at 4, col. 6; N.Y. Times, Jan. 21, 1985, sec. A,
at 5, col. 2; N.Y. Times, Apr. 28, 1985, sec. 1, pt. 1, at 5,
col. 2; N.Y. Times, Jul. 10, 1985, sec. A, at 5, col. 2; N.Y. Times,
Dec. 25, 1985, sec. 1, at 7, col. 4; N.Y. Times, Jan. 20, 1986,
sec. A, at 4, col. 5. The overall rate of attacks by Iraq has
increased during the first half of 1986. N.Y. Times, May 18,
1986, sec. 1, pt. 1, at 17, col. 1.
Q^ See Special Warning No. 67 (Appendix II) for the Iraqi
exclusion zone. Some Iraqi attacks have occurred outside the
zone, however, virtually all reported attacks subsequent to
Feb. 1984, when the blockade was declared, have been on vessels
engaged in lifting oil from Iranian ports. See Appendix I;
Int'l Ass'n of Independent Tanker Owners ( INTERTANKO) , Iran-Iraq
Conflict March 1984/1985 at 2, 8 [hereinafter cited as INTERTANKO]
(industrial publication with limited circulation).
87washington Post, Mar. 3, 1986, at A13.
^^For instance, lulls in Iraqi attacks have occurred in
October - November 1984 and in February 1985.
Q^ see Stauffer, supra note 73, at 111; McLean's Mag., May
18, 1984, at 30-31. See also Appendix I (a partial listing
of Iranian attacks — taken from the article by Dr. Danzinger,
supra note 81, at 164-67). Ships attacked include Greek, Liberian,
Indian, Panamanian, Spanish, Kuwaiti, and Saudi Arabian.
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Iranian attacks have not occurred within any defined war
zone or incident to a blockade declared by Iran. Rather, Iran's
attacks have occurred in territorial waters of Saudi Arabia
and throughout the eastern and southern portions of the Gulf.^0
Iranian attacks have been justified by Iran as reprisals to
Iraqi attacks rather than being part of a concerted effort to
shutdown commerce which either directly or indirectly benefits
Iraq's war effort. ^^ Iran has also hoped to put pressure on
the Gulf states who are generally supportive of Iraq. ^2
The tanker war has continued up to the present with alternating
rounds of attacks by each side.^^
A second aspect of the Iranian strategy in the Gulf has
been directed against Iraqi economic interests — this has been
the interdiction, by visit, search, and capture, of cargoes
carrying contraband to Iraq. This tactic, which began in 1984,
has also continued to date.
In early June 1984, Iran declared a "stop and search zone"
9Q see Associated Press (AP), May 18, 1984, International
News, AM Cycle (reporting Saudi merchant vessel attacked in
Saudi Arabia's territorial waters); Washington Post, Jun. 17,
1986, at A13; supra note 89.
9lAssociated Press (AP), May 18, 1984, International News,
AM Cycle quoting Iran's Speaker of Parliament as saying that
Iran will not "sit and watch the closure of its oil routes"
— Iran maintains that the Persian Gulf will be safe for all
— or for none; see McLean's Mag., May 28, 1984, at 30.
^^ See Stauffer, supra note 73, at 111.
^^ See N.Y. Times, May 18, 1984, sec. 1, pt . 1, at 17, col. 1;
Washington Post, Jun. 17, 1986, at A13 (attacks continue to





in the vicinity of the Strait of Horinuz.94 Iran's intent has
been to intercept war-related materials going into Iraq and
stop oil exports shipped on behalf of Iraq.^^ Iran has issued
repeated warnings of its intent to stop ships suspected of carrying
goods to or on behalf of Iraq. 96 Evidently, Iran has issued
no contraband list. This tactic has been employed against various
flag-states including French, American, and British vessels. ^"7
The details of the visit and search operations are not
available regarding many of the reported incidents. However,
to the extent that the stopping of the USS President Taylor
is illustrative of the practice, it appears that Iran is acting
consistently with traditional procedures . ^^ Merchant vessels
are signaled to "heave to", a small boarding party (which includes
an officer) embarks, where upon manifests and sample containers
are inspected. ^9 ^o injuries or damage have been reported.
^^N.Y. Times, Jun. 12, 1984, at sec. A, at 12, col. 3. Some
neutral vessels were stopped before the declaration. Id .
95[1985] 45 Facts on File No. 2354, Dec. 31, 1985, at 971-3G-
972-lD. For a report on Iranian efforts to stop oil exports,
see Washington Post, Apr. 23, 1986, at A28; see also Stauffer,
supra note 73, at 113 (assessing the Iranian visit and search
tactic in light of the overall strategies of economic warfare
in the conflict )
.
96see Washington Post, Jul. 15, 1985, at sec. 1 (Around the
World); N.Y. Times, Jan. 13, 1986, sec. A, at 1, col. 6.
^'See Washington Post, Nov. 22, 1985, at A25 (concerning
an encounter between Iranian and French vessels); N.Y. Times,
Jan. 13, 1986, sec. A, at 1, col. 6 (concerning the visit and
search of the SS President Taylor ); [1986] 46 Facts on File
No. 2357, Jan. 24, 1986, at 30-lG (concerning a British flag
vessel stopped in the Gulf of Oman). Other flag-states effected
include Kuwait, Italy, West Germany, Denmark, Yugoslavia, Poland,
and Japan. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 14, 1986, sec. A, at 1, col. 6.
9° See N.Y. Times, Jan. 14, 1986, sec. A, at 1, col. 6 (providing




Generally, the vessels have been released, however, some have
diverted to Iranian ports.
C. The Exclusion Zones and the Blockade of Kharg Island
The Iraqi and Iranian Governments have made several public
declarations regarding their intentions in the Gulf. These
declarations have established — as far as the Iraqis are concerned
— an exclusion zone and a blockade of Kharg Island.
A chronology of these declarations are set forth, belowi^OO
On 22 September 1980, U.S. Defense Mapping Agency and Hydrographic
Center (DMAHTC) issued Special Warning No. 48; which states,
in part:
1. Mariners are warned of possible hostilities in
the Persian Gulf area between Iraq and Iran. Iraq
has reasserted national boundaries which include the
Shatt Al-Arab estuary, the news media have reported
in and near the Shatt Al-Arab. Merchant ships have
reportedly been involved.
2. At 1608 GMT 22 September 1980 the Tehran Radio
Domestic Service, in Persian, reported the following:
Communique No. 17 of the Joint Staff of the Armed
Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran .
Bearing in mind the violations of the Iraqi armed
forces, all waterways near the Iranian shores are
hereby declared war zones. Iran will not allow any
merchant ship to carry cargo to the Iraqi ports.
Also, for the sake of the safety of shipping in the
l^^^v^yith respect to Iraq's pronouncements, the terms "prohibited
war zone," "restricted military zone," and "Gulf Exclusion zone,"
and the like, are used interchangeably and refer to essentially
the same thing. This chronology is taken from various special
warnings to mariners obtained from the U.S. Defense Mapping
Agency and Hydrographic Center (DMAHTC), Washington, D.C. The
content and context of these warnings were verified in an interview
on Feb. 3, 1986, with Mr. Steven Hall, Chief of the Notice to
Mariners Div'n, DMAHTC. Where available, the source of information
used by DMAHTC is indicated in the text. In addition to the
quoted warnings, herein, there were other issuances by DMAHTC




Persian Gulf, we announce that the following routes
should be observed. After the ships have passed
through Hormuz strait they should arrange their tour
so that they pass 12 miles south of Abu-Musa Island
and 12 miles away from Sirri Island and south of
Jazirfh-Ye Qeys Lighthouse and 12 miles in the south
of Kharg Island. The Islamic Republic of Iran will
not accept any responsibility concerning those who
violate this communique. (Signed) The Joint Staff
of the Armed Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran.
On 7 October 1980, DMAHTC issued Special Warning No. 50,
which stated, in part, that " Iraq has stated that the area of
the Persian Gulf north of 23-30N is a prohibited war zone."
On 16 August 1982, DMAHTC issued Special Warning No. 62,
which stated:
1. Special Warning No. 53 regarding the Persian
Gulf remains in effect except that the Iraqi govern-
ment has expanded the restricted military zone as
described below.
2. The I r aq i government has warned that it will
attack all vessels appearing within a zone believed
to be north and east of the line connecting the following
points: (A) 29-30N 48-30E; (B) 29-25N 49-09E;
(C) 28-23N 49-47E; ^D) 28-23N 51-OOE. The Iraqi
government has further warned that all tankers docking
at Kharg Island, regardless of nationality, are targets
for the Iraqi Air Force.
On 24 November 1982, DMAHTC reported the following:
Iraqi Minister [sic] of Foreign Affairs issued formal
notification to all diplomatic mission [sic] in Baghdad
demarcating the Gulf Exclusion Zone. The Iraqi govern-
ment has asked all companies and owners of oil tankers
that their vessels will be subject to danger upon
entering the exclusion zone described below. Iraq
will accept no responsibility, legal or moral obligations,
resulting from damage to vessels entering the exclusion
zone. The exclusion zone is within the following
four geographic coordinates: [repeats coordinates
set out in Special Warning No. 62, above]. 101
IOIdMAHTC authority: USINT BAGHDAD 3937 dtg 2410107 Nov. 82.
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On 28 February 1984, the New York Times reported that Iraq
has declared a blockade of Iran's Kharg Island -- quoting an
Iraqi military communique speaking over Baghdad radio: "Today
is the first day of a blockade that we have decided to impose
[on Kharg Island] which we have already declared as a restricted
military zone."102
A concise statement of existing war zone areas declared
by Iran and Iraq is set out in DMAHTC Special Warning No. 67
issued on 20 September 1985 (Appendix II).
102n.y. Times, Feb. 28, 1984, sec. A, at 1, col. 5.
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IV. An Analysis of the Tanker War
A. The Traditional Law of Contraband Control^ Visit and
Searchy Blockades^ and Exclusion zones
Whereas land warfare is directed at enemy armies and territory,
navies focus on the: "[D]efeat of the enemy navy .. .destruction
of enemy coast fortifications, and of maritime. . .establishments
on the enemy coast; cutting off intercourse with the enemy coast;
prevention of carriage of contraband. ..[ and] all kinds of support
to military operation on land...."103 The law of sea warfare
seeks to balance the rights of belligerents and neutrals in
the context of these objectives.
The attacks on neutral shipping and Iran's visit and search
operations relate to some of these objectives: preventing neutral
commerce with an enemy, contraband control, blockades, and estab-
lishing exclusion zones.
( 1 ) Preventing Commerce with an Enemy and the Status of
Nonparticipants
Stopping commerce with the enemy effects "all imports to
or exports from enemy territory by sea. . .without regard to whether
this trade is carried in enemy or neutral vessels .... "-^^^ The
neutral claims to freedom of commerce conflict with the belligerent
1032 Oppenheim-Lauterpacht , supra note 4, at sec. 173.
IQ^Law of Naval Warfare , supra note 5, at sec. 630 n. 16.
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claims to prevent assistance for the enemy. 1^^ Reconciling
these claims has been difficult. Over the years the claims
of neutrals have given way to those of belligerents. ^^^ Neutral
ships and goods became subject to capture and condemnation if
they violated belligerent rights. 10*7
The relationship between neutrals and belligerents entails
not only the objects of sea warfare but also the characteristics
of neutrality. Neutrality is the "attitude of impartiality
adopted by third States toward belligerents and recognized by
belligerents, such attitudes creating rights and duties between
the impartial States and the belligerents . "108 Traditionally,
neutrals have had to abstain from providing assistance to the
belligerents and to prevent belligerents from using neutral
resources or territory to their advantage. 109 Abstention includes
the duty not to supply (either directly or indirectly) arms,
ammunition, vessels, or other military assistance. Strict adherence
to this doctrine can result in an advantage for one belligerent
IQ^see R. Tucker, The Law of War and Neutrality at Sea , in
U.S. Naval War College, Int 1 Law studies, 1955 182 (1957).
106see Rousseau, Droit International Public 700-01 (1953).
IQ^See Studies , supra note 10, at 103.
IO82 Oppenheim-Lauterpacht , supra note 4, at sec. 293.
109i^. at sees. 294-95, 313-14.
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by altering the status quo in the military or economic balance. HO
In modern limited conflicts this has been accentuated by increased
economic interdependence and reliance on other states for obtaining
arms. Consequently, there has been a trend away from strict
adherence to traditional neutral prescriptions and towards various
or relative degrees of neutrality by nonparticipat ing states.
m
Under the traditional rules, belligerents treated neutrals
in accordance with their impartiality and did not interfere
with neutral activities which did not violate the neutral's
obligations of abstention and prevention. ^^2 However, belligerents
could employ methods such as blockades and visit, search, and
capture procedures to prevent illicit trade with the enemy. -^^-^
The traditional rules surrounding neutrality were formulated
largely in the pre-twentieth century era and have been drastically
affected by twentieth century events.
H^Norton, Between Ideology and the Reality: The Shadow of
the Law of Neutrality
, 17 Harv. Int 1 L. J. 249, 297-302 (1976)
(states often describe their neutral status as "qualified neu-
trality," "non-belligerency," "neo-neutrality , " and the like.)
Neutrals are sometimes referred to as "nonparticipants, " that
is, not engaged in actual hostilities but whose activities
or policies may benefit one or the other side. In this analysis,
third parties to the Iran-Iraq conflict are referred to as
"neutrals" -- this does not necessarily mean that such states
are strictly neutral, rather it refers to neutrality in the
broader sense as including all states which are nonpartici-
pants .
msee id. at 278; Address by Attorney General R.H. Jackson
Before Inter-American Bar Assoc., Havana, Mar. 27, 1941, 35
Amer. J. Int'l L. 348 (1941), portions reprinted in W. Bishop
International Law 1052-55 (3^ ed. 1962).
^^^2 Oppenheim-Lauterpacht , supra note 4, at sec. 315.
ll^Id. at sec. 319.
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The international legal order established under the United
Nations has undermined the ideological basis for neutrality
by outlawing all war except that waged either in collective
or individual self-defense . H^ Under the U.N. Charter, an
aggressor is to be designated by the Security Council which
may authorize collective action. ^^^ States which would normally
be neutral become involved in the U.N. -sponsored action. Neutrality
becomes an exception rather than a rule for states outside the
initial hostilities. In practice, however, the Security Council
has not designated aggressors and relative positions of neutrality
have continued in fact, if not by formal declaration.-'-^^
( 2) Contraband Control
The law of armed conflict allows belligerents to characterize
goods which can be prevented from being imported to an enemy.
Traditionally, imports were catagorized as absolute contraband,
conditional contraband, or free goods. ^^^ Contraband is cargo
destined for enemy use even though transported through neutral
territory . ^^8 <phe modern trend has been to expand the catagories
ll^See Norton, supra note 110, at 249-50; U.N. Charter arts. 2(4),
51.
ll^u.N. Charter arts. 39, 41-42.
11 ^see Norton, supra note 110, at 249-78 (discussing continued
reliance on neutrality doctines despite the U.N. Charter and
reviewing neutrality doctrines in post-World War II conflicts).
ll^See M. McDougal & F. Felicano, supra note 4, at 481-88;
see also 2 D. O'connell, The International Law of the Sea 1142-44
( 1979) Tdiscussing basic contraband doctrine).
^1°2 D. o'connell, supra note 117, at 1144-47 (discussing
the doctrines of enemy destination and continuous voyage).
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of contraband to include nearly all commodities . ^^ This was
the case during the two World Wars. 120 professor O'connell explains
the reason and importance of this trend:
The expansion of the list of contraband [has become]
a matter of relative c ir cumstance . . . . [T] he practice
in general war being to mobilize all resources, commodities
became subject to government direction irrespective
of their [military and civilian] utility...
* * *
While the condition of modern total war obviously
undermined the application of the traditional doctrine
of contraband, the doctrine itself is not thereby
annulled. The central principle [remains] the actual
committment of goods to the prosecution of war, and
it is obvious that the principle is differentially
applicable in different circumstances. ^21
Traditional law also allowed belligerents to prevent exports
from leaving enemy territory in order to stop the inflow of
foreign currency. 122
( 3) Visit and Search Procedure
One method of contraband control is stopping and visiting
neutral vessels suspected of carrying contraband . 123 visit
and search is the physical inspection by a belligerent of neutral
vessels for determining its content, nationality, origin, and




122^. McDougal & F. Feliciano, supra note 6, at 487-88.
123id. at 88; see also Law of Naval Warfare , supra note 5,




on ships at sea outside neutral j ur isdiction . '^^ If contra-
band is found, or if a ship resists, it may be seized and brought
to port for disposi t ion . -^25 visit and search is essentially
a peaceful means of interdicting neutral commerce; implicitly
it proscribes destroying neutral vessels under normal circum-
stances. 126
Customary rules of visit and search are recognized in several
conventional formulations. The unratified Naval Declaration
of London 1909 implicitly recognizes the right of visit and
search by providing rules on contraband control and blockade. ^27
The unratified Washington Treaty of 1922 explicitly recognizes
the right of visit and search and the concomittant obligation
not to attack a merchant vessel unless it refuses to submit
to a visit and search. ^28
Visit and search procedures were used in exceptional cir-
cumstances during World War II. Post-World War II experiences
include Egyptian visits and searches in the 1948 and 1956 Arab-
l^^Whether visit and search may be carried out on neutral
vessels under convoy of warships of the same nationality is
unsettled. See Law of Naval Warfare , supra note 5, at sec. 502,
n.lO, at 5-9 -- 5-10.
125see 2 Oppenheim-Lauterpacht , supra note 4, at sees. 422,
429; see generally Harvard Draft Convention on the Rights and
Duties of Neutral Powers in Naval and Aerial War, art. 54,
reprinted in 33 Am. J. Int'l. L. Supp. 535-36 (1939) (detailing
traditional visit and search procedures).
126see 2 D. O'Connell, supra note 117, at 1115-16 (setting
forth the traditional basis for destroying neutral vessels,
i.e., in emergencies where capture is infeasible)
.
127see Conference of London 1909 reprinted in The Law of Armed
Conflicts (Documents) No. 56, at 623-36, (D. Schindler & J. Toman
eds. 2^ rev. ed. 1981) [hereinafter cited as Schindler & Toman).
12 8see Washington Treaty of 1922, art. 1,43 Stat. 1655, T.S. 671
reprinted in , id. No. 58, at 657-59.
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Israeli Wars on ships passing through the Suez canal. ^29 These
procedures were also used in the Indo-Pakistani War of 1965.1^0
In both wars customary legal prescriptions were recognized. ^^1
Practical obstacles to visit and search include the need for
an adequate surface forces to carry out the operation and the
vulnerability of such forces to counterattack . ^^2
(4 ) Blockade
A more comprehensive means of preventing economic activity
with an enemy is the blockade, which is:
[T]he isolation, by means of blockading forces and
the observance of certain rules of law, of a port
or line of coast belonging to or occupied by the
enemy. ..so that the enemy's trade [ is ]... impeded
since shipping in the blockaded area cannot approach
the coast ... .Blockade is a legal institution peculiar
to naval warfare ... .Although in practice blockade ... is
in the first instance aimed at neutrals, the ultimate
purpose is to inflict damage upon the enemy. ^^^
Blockades are intended to isolate an enemy economically,
i.e., to prevent imports or exports from reaching or leaving
enemy territory . ^^^
The blockade is part of the customary law, but is also
reflected in convention: the Declaration of Paris 1856 recognizes
blockades and requires that they be effective in order to be
129see Norton, supra note 110, at 304-05.
l^Old. at 305.
131id.
l^^wiiiiams. Neutrality in Modern Armed Conflicts: A Survey
of the Developing Law , 90 Mil.L.R. 9, 43 (1980).
l^^Castren, The Present Law of War and Neutrality 293-94 (1954),
quoted in 10 M. Whiteman, Digest of International Law 861 (1973).
l^'^R. Tucker, supra note 105, at 284-85.
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binding;135 the Declaration of London 1909 provides specific
limitations on enforcing blockades . 1^6
Customary law imposes certain requirements in establishing
and maintaining a blockade, which include: formal declaration
of blockade by competent authority serving notice on neutrals
of the location, limits, and duration of the blockade; it may
apply only to enemy-owned or occupied positions; it must be
effective; and it must be impartially enforced. ^^^
Pre-twent ieth century blockades were generally enforced
by surface warships operating close-in to the coast. 1^8 Blockades
have been sometimes maintained by other means, e.g., by mines,
coastal artillery, aircraft, and submarines, which were not
illegal per se, but require adherence to the other established
rules such as notice, peaceful stoppage, capture, and condemna-
tion. 1^9 Accordingly, these auxiliary methods were employed
only to augment enforcement by surface warships. 1^0
l^Speclaration of Paris 1856, reprinted in Schindler & Tomanr
supra note 127, No. 48, at 567-69.
l^^Naval Declaration of London 1909, ch. 1., supra note 127,
at 625-27.
l^^See M. McDougal & F. Feliciano, supra note 6, at 490-91;
Law of Naval Warfare , supra note 5, at sec. 632.
136see Mallison & Mallison, A Survey of the International
Law of Blockades in U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Feb. 1976,
at 44. 46.
^^^See M. McDougal & F. Feliciano, supra note 6, at 478.
l^Qsee Castren, The Present Law of War and Neutrality 300-01
(1954) quoted in 10 M. Whiteman, supra note 133, at 865; see
also 2 Oppenheim-Lauterpacht , supra note 4, at sec. 380b (stating
that aircraft alone cannot enforce a blockade).
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Neutral ships breaching a blockade are subject to capture
and condemnation as prizes of war.l'^l Neutral vessels may not
be destroyed unless the capturing warship is endangered and
then only if all persons and papers on board are placed in
safety. ^^^2 These rules are refined in the London Treaty of
1930 which provides: "[Ejxcept in the case of persistent refusal
to stop on being duly summoned, or of active resistance to visit
and search, a warship, whether surface vessel or submarine,
may not sink or render incapable of navigation a merchant vessel
without having first placed passengers, crew and ship's papers
in a place of safety. ^^^
During the World Wars, blockades took on a new form. As
surface force weaponry, air power, and submarines proliferated,
modern warfare necessitated modification of traditional blockade
practices. The Allies in both wars took advantage of their
surface seapower by instituting long-distance blockades . ^^^
Germany, on the other hand, sought similar objectives through
141h. Smith, The Law and Custom of the Sea 143 {3^ ed. 1959),
quoted in 10 M. Whiteman, supra note 133, at 862; Naval Conference
of London 1909, ch. 1, supra note 127, at 625-27.
l^^see Washington Treaty of 1922, art. 1, supra note 128,
at 657-58; Naval Conference of London 1909, arts. 48-54, supra
note 127, at 632-33.
143see London Treaty of 1930, art. 22(2), 46 Stat. 2858, T.S.
830, reprinted in Schindler & Toman, supra note 127, No. 59,
at 661-62; see also 1936 London Protocol, 13 Stat. 1363, T.S.
919, reprinted in Documents on the Laws of War 147-50 (A. Roberts
& R. Guelff eds. 1982) (carrying over the rules on destroying
merchant vessels past expiration of the London Treaty of 1930).
In modern practice this has not been extended to neutral ships
integrated into the enemy war effort -- such ships are subject
to the same treatment as enemy merchant vessels. See Studies,
supra note 10, at 122-32.
144see infra pp. 37-40.
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the use of exclusion zones. ^^^
(5) Exclusion Zones ^^^
Exclusion zones are a twentieth century development; like
blockades, they provide a means of controlling commercial relations
between an enemy and neutral states. These zones are high seas
areas made subject to a degree of control by a belligerent in
which neutral shipping is prevented from operating freely. ^^^
Such zones were widely used in the World Wars as part of compre-
hensive economic strategies.
In World War I, Great Britain declared the entire North
Sea a military area and enforced it with minefields. Although
lanes of safe passage were provided for interneutral trade,
damage was still inflicted on neutral ships. 1^8
Germany's declared war zones around the British Isles. ^^^
Germany enforced the zone with its U-Boats and, at first, attempted
to restrict its attacks to enemy merchant vessels. However,
^"^^See infra notes 149-50, 152, 155 and accompanying text.
^^^The terms "exclusion zones," and "war zones" refer to the
same basic concept. These terms are used herein interchangeably.
-'•^'^Such zones are similar to operational zones and defensive
zones. Operational zones are high seas areas in which hostilities
are occurring or are imminent. Their purpose is to ward off
neutral vessels which may interfere with hostilities. A defensive
zone is belligerent control of high seas areas adjacent to its
territorial sea. These zones ensure the security of the bel-
ligerent's territory. These methods are not directed against
neutrals per se, rather they ensure the efficient employment
of naval operations and enhance coastal defenses. See R. Tucker,
supra note 105, at 299-301.
l^^See 2 Oppenheim-Lauterpacht , supra note 4, at sec. 319a;
2 D. O'Connell, supra note 117, at 1109.
^^^2 Oppenheim-Lauterpacht, supra note 4, at sec. 319a.
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practical difficulties in distinguishing ships and exposing
the submarines to counterattack if it abided by traditional
prescriptions led Germany to embark upon the so-called strategy
of unrestricted submarine warfare against all merchant shipping
in the war zones. ^^^
In World War II, the pattern repeated itself. The Allies
invoked comprehensive economic warfare measures in the form
of a long-distance blockade and the navicert system. ^^^ Germany
declared large war zones around Great Britain -- citing the
aggressive tactic of the Allies, Germany declared that all neutral
merchant vessels within the zones were subject to attack. ^^^
In the Pacific theatre the United States also declared
war zones in order to specify areas in which unrestricted warfare
would be carried out against enemy merchant vessels incorporated
into the war effort. However, as a practical matter, there
was no neutral merchant vessel involvement . ^^^
l^Qstudies , supra note 10, at 62-65.
ISljd. at 81, 113, 131-32.
152jd. at 75-76. Great Britain also declared a war zone in
the Skagerrak, although neutral ships were not attacked in the




B. Developments in the Law of Blockade and Exclusion
Zones During the World Wars
Sea warfare changed dramatically during the two World Wars.
As discussed above, large operational war zones, long-distance
blockades, submarine warfare, and comprehensive trade embargoes
developed in the twentieth century. These developments have
affected the law of armed conflict and provide a basis for
analyzing the legality of the Iraqi and Iranian practices.
The methods used by the Allies and Germans reflect the
realities of modern naval warfare. The British used large surface
forces to impose a long-distance blockade against Germany, thus
avoiding German submarine attacks which could defend against
a close-in blockade. 1^4 ^he Germans, lacking sufficient surface
forces, used submarines to attack shipping in a war zone around
Great Britain. ^^^ Each strategy avoided the defensive abilities
of the adversary.
Both strategies were directed at not only enemy vessels
and property, but also neutral vessels and property used to
support the enemy's war effort. According to Professor Mallison,
the widespread use of these methods affirmed the notion that
complete interdiction of "commercial intercourse between the
enemy belligerent and neutrals is now widely accepted as lawful
in general war."^^^ Professor Mallison states the legal con-
154id. at 60.
155id. at 59-60.
156id. at 61 (footnote omitted) and n.33.
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sequences of this: "[The lawfulness of interdicting all neutral
commerce with the enemy] reflects the actual economic war.fare
techniques of the World Wars and changed the focus of legal
analysis from the objective itself to the various methods of
achieving it. "1^7
The long-distance blockades and war zones of the two World
Wars were, at the time, justified by the claimants as reprisals
for the other's breach of traditional limitations on economic
and sea warfare. 1^8 However, the fundamental changes in the
technology, the increased importance of economic warfare objectives,
and the widespread disregard of traditional prescriptions, raises
the question of whether long-distance blockades or war zones
may be employed in this manner as a claim of right.
( 1 ) The Long-Distance Blockade
The impact of the long-distance blockade on the law of
blockade is not settled. Some writers view it as a latent
development in the law through repeated reprisal practices thus
suggesting a claim of right. For instance, Oppenheim states:
[I]t is... clear that in so far as modern warfare has
assumed a predominately economic character, some of
the rules of the accepted law of blockade have become
inapplicable in the changed conditions of naval war...
and that unless altered by agreement they are likely
to be honoured more in the breach than in the observance.
Thus viewed, [the long-distance blockade] regularly
and uniformly repeated in successive wars in the form
^^^Studies , supra note 10, at 61.




of reprisals and aiming at the economic isolation of the
opposing belligerent must be regarded as the development
of the latent principle of the law of blockade, namely
that the belligerent who possesses the effective command
of the sea is entitled to deprive his opponent of the use
thereof for the purpose either of navigation by his own
vessels or of conveying on neutral vessels such goods as
are destined to or originate from him.^^^
Other writers concede that a long-distance blockade may
be a legitimate reprisal, but question its lawfulness as a claim
of right. 160
Professor O'Connell points out the confusion and controversial
state of the law:
The practice during the two World Wars has left
the law of blockade devoid of most of its traditional
characteristics, so that its present applicability
and content are questionable. Close blockade. . .was
made obsolete by long-range coast defense, torpedo
boats, and minef ields . . . .The notion of long-distance
blockade accommodated [the need]... to control strategic
commodities, their price mechanisms and the credit
to gain access to them.
The question is whether [the technological, social,
and commercial changes of modern-day warfare and commerce]
have wrought a fundamental change in the law of blockade.
The efforts made to justify long-distance blockade
during both World Wars on the doctrine of reprisals
indicate a want of assurance about the elasticity
of the law of blockade. ... ^^l
Professor O'connell concludes that since long-distance blockades
were not at the time justified as claims of right and were reliant
159id. at sec. 390c.
leOgee R. Tucker, supra note 105, at 307; 2 D. O'Connell,
supra note 117, at 1154-55.
I6I2 D. o'connell, supra note 117, at 1154.
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on additional administrative controls, it cannot be concluded
that customary prescriptions have changed. Moreover, he asserts
that their relevance may be greater in the context of limited
warfare since
[T]he theory of self-defense which underlies the concept
of [limited war since 1945] tends to insulate the
high seas and neutral shipping therein from the state
of hostilities, if not absolutely, then certainly
to a much greater extent than the conditions of general
war. It is unlikely that the international community
would tolerate interference with neutral shipping. . . . [This
would be] contrary to the United Nations Charter. 1°2
Professor Tucker also stresses the continued vitality of
at least part of the customary blockade prescriptions. He admits
that these prescriptions were largely ignored during the World
Wars, and that blockades now encompass contraband of broader
definition, nevertheless the requirement of effectiveness and the
allowable consequence for breaching a blockade remain unchanged
— that is, liability to seizure, but not destruction. 1^^
Since World War II there have been several instances in
which blockades have been declared as part of an economic warfare
strategy. However, these precedents provide little guidance
on the status of the law or for this analysis since the facts
are not sufficiently analogous to the Iran-Iraq situation.
They do, however, illustrate the continued value and use of
embargo strategies in limited warfare. A brief discussion of
some of these experiences is set forth, below.
162id. at 1155-56.
^^^ See R. Tucker, supra note 105, at 316-17.
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In the Korean War, U.N. forces imposed a close-in blockade
on North Korea which was enforced by surface warships. 1^4 rpj-^g
blockade required a large number of ships and was difficult
to enforce. 165 The economic restrictions imposed on North Korea
were comprehensive and included fishing along its coasts. ^^^
During the Cuban missile crisis, the United States used
a special purpose blockade. It was devised to interdict the
shipment of strategic weapons from the Soviet Union to Cuba.^^^
This blockade did not precede or follow actual hostilities.
There were no declared blockades during the Vietnam War.
However , U.S. /South Vietnamese tactics were analogous to blockade. 1^8
Operation Market Time, begun in 1965, was designed to prevent
infiltration of North Vietnamese forces into South Vietnam. '•^^
Surface craft searched, captured or destroyed enemy vessels. ^^0
This operation was limited to the territorial waters of South
Vietnam; high seas traffic was unimpeded. 1^1
The mining of North Vietnam's ports in 1972 is more closely
akin to a traditional blockade. Its geographic limits were
the territorial waters of the enemy and its purpose limited
164see M. Cagle & F. Manson, The Sea War in Korea 281 (1957).
165id. at 283.
166id. at 296-97.
l^^See generally Mallison & Mallison, supra note 138, at 50;
Mallison & Mallison, Limited Naval Blockade or Quarantine -
Interdiction: National and Collective Defense claims Valid
Under International Law , 31 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 335-98 (1962)
(providing a detailed account of the Cuban missile crisis).





to interdicting seaborne supplies. 1^2 This was a functional
equivalent to blockade and could be justified accordingly.!^^
There was also a traditional close-in blockade of Eilat
and the Gulf and Aqaba by Egypt against Israel in 1967. ^^^
Egypt also imposed a blockade during the hostilities of 1973
when it closed access to Israel from the southern end of the
Red Sea at Bab al Mandeb.^^^ This tactic paralleled the practices
of World War II since it occurred a long distance from Israel's
ports. 1*76
Attacks on shipping occurred during the short-lived 1971
Indo-Pakistani conflict. The Indians attacked neutral shipping
on the high seas in an effort to blockade the port of Karachi.
Reports at the time indicated that India had proclaimed a blockade,
but at least one commentator has suggested that no blockade
was formally established and the attacks on international shipping
were highly questionable from a legal standpoint . ^^^ Since
the war ended quickly, no pattern of conduct or organized response
by the international community developed. 1^8
In the Falkland Islands War, Great Britain initially declared
a Maritime Exclusion Zone around the Falklands in which Argentine






177see 2 D. O'Connell, supra note 117, at 1099; D. O'Connell,
The Influence of Law on Seapower 129-39 (1975).
-^-^^ See supra note 177.
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a Total Exclusion zone in which any ships operating in the zone
and in support of the Argentinians were at risk.1'79 This was
self -defensive in purpose; it was not directed against neutral
shipping, although the British Government referred to it as
a blockade (inferring that, if necessary, neutrals would be
subject to attack). 180 Notwithstanding this characterization,
there were no attacks on neutral trade.
These examples illustrate that economic warfare, including
blockade procedures, can be strategically and tactically useful
in limited warfare. They illustrate too that blockades in limited
wars generally do not follow traditional formulations: close-in
blockades (such as that used against North Korea) have been
used, with some difficulty, but special purpose blockades, blockades
enforced by mining, attacks on international shipping, and long-
distance blockades, have also been employed in the post-World
War II era.
( 2) Exclusion Zones
After World War I, there was clear international sentiment
that Germany's use of submarines against neutral shipping was
unlawful -- submarines were subject to the same restrictions
as surface vessels vis-a-vis treatment of neutral vessels.
I'^^see 2 D. o'connell, supra note 117, at 1111; see also Levie,
The Falklands Crisis and the Law of War in The Falklands War
64-66 (A. Coll & A. Arend eds. 1985) (providing a detailed summary
of the British exclusion zone).




Accordingly, during the interwar years there were efforts to
modify customary prescriptions to specifically include submarines. ^81
Germany's use of exclusion zones and submarines, during
World War II (which repeated the pattern of World War I) left
commentators at odds over the legal status of such operations.
The orthodox view -- and perhaps the weight of opinion
— maintains that indiscriminate attack on neutral vessels within
prescribed exclusion zones remains unlawful, except perhaps
as a reprisal. 182 professor Tucker, for example, referring
to exclusion zones of the World Wars, states:
[I]t does not appear possible to assert that — apart
from reprisal -- belligerents have at present the
right to restrict the movement of neutral vessels
within vast tracts of the open seas merely by proclaiming
that these areas have been rendered dangerous — in
one form or another — to neutral shipping.^83
Even if done in reprisal such zones Professor Tucker asserts
that belligerents must provide avenues of safe passage for
neutrals. 184
A differing assessment of exclusion zones and unrestricted
warfare against merchant vessels is made by Professor Mallison,
who states that Germany's methods may be justified as a reprisal.
ISlsee D. O'connell, supra note 177, at 47-48.
182 see , e.g. , R. Tucker, supra note 105, at 302.
18 3i^. at 3 05; see also C. Colombos, International Law of
the Sea sec. 857 (6*^^ rev. ed. 1967) (discussing Germany s failure
to adhere to customary prescriptions and the ineffectiveness
of its war zone strategy); 2 Oppenheim-Lauterpacht , supra note
4, at sec. 319a (maintaining that war zones — of the sort employed
by Germany are legitimate as a claim of right only as between
belligerents — neutrals may be made the objects of such tactics
only as part of a lawful reprisal, and then only to the extent
reasonable under the circumstances).
184r. Tucker, supra note 105, at 305.
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but also as requiring an adaptation of old rules to new methods
in the same way that blockade rules were adapted to meet the
contingencies of the long-distance blockade. ^^^ In his view,
the legality of German practices must be assessed, in part,
on the basis of the legitimacy of the object sought. In the
context of the World Wars, complete interdiction of economic
activity between the enemy and neutrals became a widely accepted
practice. 186 Enemy merchant ships participating in the war
effort became lawful targets because of their economic value
and defensive capabilities ; ^^^ neutral merchant ships engaged
in the same activities as enemy ships were accorded similar
treatment . 188
Germany's warfare against neutral shipping developed out
of the technological changes in weaponry and comprehensive economic
objectives. The operational capabilities and limitations on
submarines (which were Germany's strength) and the countervailing
defenses inherent in large surface and air forces, necessitates
a reassessment of the law -- just as the strategic necessity
of long-distance blockades necessitates juridical modifications. ^^^
18 5 See Studies, supra note 10, at 65-71. A similar assessment
presumably applies to Germany's war zone practices of World
War II, see id. at 78. See also 2 Oppenheim-Lauterpacht , supra
note 4, at 390c.
lo^Studies, supra note 10, at 61.
187id. at 106-23.
188l^. at 129-30, 132. As a practical matter, most if not
all shipping transiting the German-declared zones were function-
ally integrated into the Allied war effort, either because of
political affiliation with the British or as product of the






Professor Mallison points out the relative effectiveness
and efficiency of Germany's tactics and the initial attempts
to abide by traditional rules regarding neutrals. ^^0 He also
compares the des
t
ruct i veness of submarine warfare to that of
surface forces:
The ultimate sanction applied to merchant vessels
which failed to acquiesce in the intermediate sanctions
and persisted in attempting to run the blockade was
gunf i re . . . . The refusal by a merchant ship to comply
with that warning involved in a proclaimed submarine
operational area,... may be said to be tantamount
to persistent refusal to stop. . .
.
[T]here is no reason
why torpedo attack without further warning should
be regarded as more destructive of neutral human
and material values than gunfire from surface war-
ships. 191
In addir.ion, Germany's exclusion zones were reasonable
in light of their military effectiveness in interdicting commerce
and in their minimization of destruction by giving clear notice
to neutrals to stay out of certain areas. 1^2 These conditions,
coupled with the value of neutral trade to Great Britain's war
effort, leads Professor Mallison to conclude that Germany's
practices were lawful as a claim of right. 1^3
After World War II, the International Military Tribunal
at Nuremburg indicted Admiral Donitz for, inter alia , "waging




l^^See i_d. at 74. Professor Mallison's conclusion applies




Protocol. "194 The Tribunal did not find him guilty of attacking
British armed merchant ships, but did convict him of conducting
unrestricted warfare against neutral ships. The rationale was
the customary requirements for visit and search and destruction
only upon placing crew, passengers, and ship's papers in a place
of safety. 195 Additionally, the Tribunal apparently considered
Germany's war zone illegal since it was not effectively enforced. 1^6
The Tribunal's decision is criticized by Professor Mallison
as overly narrow and mechanical in its interpretation of the
law and in its conclusion that no exception for operational
areas was intended in the conventional formulations of the
interwar years. 197
( 3 ) An Evaluation of the Law concerning Blockades and
Exclusion Zones -- Belligerent versus Neutral Claims
When and to what extent should traditional or customary
rules of law give way to the emerging practices of states?
As methods and objectives of warfare evolve, a degree of tension
between existing rules and the new realities of war is inevitable.
There must be a balance between conserving customary rules which
194i^. at 77; 1 International Military Tribunal (I.M.T.) 311
(1947)
.
I95see 1 I.M.T. 312-13, discussed in Studies , supra note 10,
at 79-80, 115-22.
196 see 1 I.M.T. 332-33, discussed in Studies , supra note 10,
at 82-84. Professor Mallison refutes this conclusion, arguing
that the German enforcement was effective. Studies , supra note
10, at 77.
197see Studies , supra note 10, at 80.
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uphold the principles of military necessity and humanity and
maintain the relevance of law to developing technological and
strategic realities. If changes are made too easily, states
will freely embark upon any form of destruction perceived as
useful and fashion an emergent norm as justification; if the
law remains unresponsive to reasonable adaptations to new methods,
states may justify their actions as lawful reprisals or simply
ignore the law altogether.
Applying these issues to modern embargo practices, the
conclusions of Professors McDougal and Feliciano are noteworthy:
The embargo measures repetitively applied in the two
world wars realistically involve something more than
the exceptional, emerg<ancy responses to a violation
of an unquestioned authoritative prescription which
the conception of "reprisals' ordinarily connotes.
The nearly universal nonobservance in two global wars
of certain nineteenth century prescriptions which
these measures reflect strongly suggest, on the con-
trary, the clear emergence and crystallization of
the particular expectations of uniformities and right-
ness in decision commonly called law -- or, in other
words, in growth and development of new patterns of
customary law.^^S
With respect to blockades, military technology has revolu-
tionized the strategy. Aircraft and missiles make close-in
blockades dangerous -- on the other hand, mines, submarines,
and sophisticated surveillance and fast aircraft make long-distance
blockades effective and less risky. -^^^
With respect to exclusion zones and unrestricted warfare
against neutral commerce in such zones a similar argument can
198^. McDougal & F. Feliciano, supra note 6, at 479 (footnotes
omitted)
.
199see Williams, supra note 132, at 44.
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be made. Depending on the relative strengths of the opposing
forces, exclusion zones may -- as Professor Mallison points
out -- provide a logical and reasonable alternative for isolating
the enemy economically:
[In a future (non-nuclear) general war] it is realistic
to expect claims to establish submarine operational
areas because some major states do not have the capa-
city to conduct independent naval operations on the
high seas except through the extensive use of sub-
marines . 200
As with long-distance blockades, widespread use of the exclusion
zone during the World Wars -- even though justified as reprisals
— signifies more than an aberation from customary law, rather
it is a development in the law based on the effective use of
new weapons and the expanded scope of economic warfare.
One result of this development is less freedom for neutrals
navigating near hostilities. Depending on the circumstances,
belligerents may seek to stop all commerce with the enemy.
The methods used may necessarily "restrict greatly all neutral
trade in the geographic proximity of the opposing belligerent . "201
Professor O'Connell discusses the resulting balance between
neutral and belligerent interests in the context of emerging
norms of international law:
Neutrality is thus not an absolute right for if it
were it would negate belligerency. An accomodation
is to be arrived at between the two conditions simply
because of the coexistance of neutral and belligerent
nations in community, and the accomodation will eventually
200stud_ies, supra note 10, at 91 (footnotes omitted).
201williams, supra note 132, at 45.
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reflect the technological and commercial factors of
the moment, and is not a static condition. ^02
In summary, the law of blockade and exclusion zones has
undergone change during the twentieth century. Practices heretofore
considered unlawful except as a reprisal are now arguably legitimate
as a claim of right depending on the circumstances of their
use.
The dynamic nature of warfare requires evaluating new practices
on a contextual basis. The customary law retains at least part
of its vitality — but the question of where and when it will
be asserted appropriately and successfully (in terms of influencing
the decision-making process) will depend on the circumstances
of the particular conflict. 203 jn the context of belligerent
claims to stop the flow of goods to or from the enemy, customary
law protects neutral freedom to conduct economic relations to
the greatest extent possible. As for belligerent rights, modern-day
warfare requires a flexible approach: " [R]easonableness under
the circumstances. No a priori rules will provide the answers....
2022 O'connell, supra note 117, at 1102.
203see Norton, supra note 110, at 257-76. Mr. Norton reviews
neutrality doctrines in the post-World War II years and concludes
that neutrality's "shadowy" existance signifies a decline in
its importance. Ideological, technological, and commercial
developments have contributed to this decline. Nevertheless,
there is still a need to regulate relations between belligerents
and neutrals -- sometimes general principles of international
law suffice, on other occasions, rules peculiar to neutrality
doctrine have been invoked. The ability of these rules to protect
the competing interests of neutral and belligerent often depends
of the relative power and influence of the states involved and
their ability to conduct their relations on the basis of effective
reciprocity. id. at 306-11.
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[And in] the absence of organized community decision, the rule
of proportionality must provide the guide ...." 204
Contemporary legal decision-making regarding warfare practices
entails balancing neutral and belligerent rights and a contextual
analysis. Professors McDougal and Feliciano discuss the utility
of this approach:
From a realistic perspective, what may appropriately
be emphasized is that all the various control measures
[such as visit and search, blockade, and exclusion
zones] are but differing modalities, with varying
procedures and detailed effects, invented in response
to differing conditions of application, for achieving
the same objective of denying the enemy commerce which
might benefit him. To appraise the lawfulness of
newer modalities, devised to meet new conditions of
warfare, in terms of the requirements projected in
traditional law for an older modality is to impose
an impossible rigidity upon the process of customary
development ... .The lawfulness of modern measures is...
a function of the detailed factors that compose particular
contexts [and a ]... determination of reasonableness
in particular contexts.
* - * *
204v/iiiiams, supra note 132, at 42. Professor Williams elaborates
on the factors which should be considered in assessing the legal
claims of belligerents and neutrals. In his view, these include:
the relative power of the belligerent, past belligerent - neutral
relations; the nature of the belligerent objectives; the geographical
extent and duration of the conflict; the relative importance
of the national interests at stake; and the nature of the weaponry
used. Id. at 13-14.





Professors McDougal and Feliciano go on to suggest various criteria
which they view as appropriate for such analysis. 206 Borrowing
from their criteria, this analysis assesses the following factors
with respect to the Iraqi and Iranian practices: (1) the degree
of compliance with traditional legal criteria regarding the
practices in issue; (2) the context of limited warfare; (3)
the comprehensiveness of the conflict; (4) the imperatives of
military necessity and effectiveness; (5) the claimants' objectives;
(6) the degree of interference with neutral values; and (7)




V. Analysis of the Iraqi and Iranian Practices
A. The Iraqi Practice
Since 1984, Iraq's exclusion zone and blockade of Iran
are part of a single strategy to cutoff oil leaving Iran's principal
port at Kharg Island. This analysis addresses those attacks
on neutral ships occurring inside the Iraqi exclusion zone. 207
(1 ) The Degree of Compliance with Traditional Legal Criteria
Regarding Blockade and Exclusion zones
Iraq's strategy exemplifies the fusion of blockade and
exclusion zone practices employed during the World Wars. The
exclusion zone and the attacks on shipping serve to enforce
the blockade.
Iraq's actions are consistent with certain customary practices
surrounding exclusion zones and blockades. Both measures were
publicly declared and given wide dissemination so that all neutral
states were on notice of Iraq's intentions . 208 The exclusion
zone and blockade are contiguous to Iranian coastal areas and
islands -- no neutral coast or port is blockaded or adjacent
to the exclusion zone. Iraq's enforcement has been impartial
— as evidenced by the universality of its declarations and
the numerous flag-states' ships which have been subjected to
^O^see supra pp. 19-20, 23-25 and accompanying notes. The
exclusion zone functionally coincides with blockade.




An aspect of the blockade which falls short of traditional
formulations is the apparent lack of effectiveness. The attacks
have been successful in terms of hitting their intended target,
however, the attacks have been pursued sporadically and have
failed to cutoff oil trade with iran.^lO
The requirement for effectiveness is a factual issue without
precise means of measurement . 211 strict and liberal interpretations
have been made, the former requiring prevention of all passage,
the latter requiring only that passage by rendered dangerous . 212
For ships lifting oil from Kharg Island, clearly ingress
and egress has been rendered dangerous as evidenced by the
precautions taken by merchantmen and the increased insurance
premiums. 213 jt is not apparent, however, that the tankers
are sufficiently threatened to make the blockade "effective."
The blockade is ineffective under the traditional formulation,
since Iran's oil trade continues and ships remain willing --
2Q9see supra pp. 19-20 and accompanying notes; appendix I.
210see supra pp. 19-29 and accompanying notes; see also R. Nokes,
AP News Analysis, BC Cycle, Jan. 25, 1985, Washington Dateline;
N.Y. Times, May 30, 1984, sec. D, at 1, col. 3; N.Y. Times,
Jan. 30, 1985, sec. 4, at 5, col. 1 (assessing the overall
effectiveness of Iraq's strategy -- and concluding that Iran's
oil exports have been hampered and this has been costly to Iran's
economy, but not fatal to its ability to carry on the war; the
tanker war is more a psychological deterrent than a militarily
effective strategy).
211r. Tucker, supra note 105, at 288-89.
2122 Oppenheim-Lauterpacht , supra note 4, at sees. 380-81.
213 see INTERTANKO, supra note 86, at 10-12 ( recommending certain
precautions be taken by merchant vessels); appendix II (warning
to mariners) Time Mag., Jun. 4, 1984, at 3 (discussing higher
insurance premiums for tankers).
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in relatively large numbers -- to assume the risk of trading
with Iran.
The issue is at what point does Iraq meet the effectiveness
requirement. And assuming it can be met, does the practice
otherwise remain lawful in the context of its usage?
Applying the effectiveness requirement should include several
considerations: must effectiveness be assessed solely on the
proportion of ships attacked and hit to the total number attempting
to breach the blockade, or should effectiveness be based --
in whole or in part -- on the overall long-term impact of the
practice on the enemy's economy?214 The traditional requirements
for blockade were formulated by the large maritime powers whose
capability to carry out sea and air warfare objectives were
great. This conflict involves belligerents of lesser military
capability. Does this dictate a different standard for assessing
the legitimacy of their practices in terms of effectiveness?
And lastly, the requirement for effectiveness invites added
destruction of neutral values — effectiveness implies successful
enforcement presumably through forceful means. At what point
does this render the requirement counterproductive to its intended
purpose of protecting neutral values and minimizing destruction?
Should neutral states be under some obligation to halt trade
214jj^an's economy is under severe strain caused by the war
and the revolution of 1978-79. The tanker war has contributed
to the economic deterioration in Iran. Iran's continued ability
to export oil may ultimately decide the outcome of the war.
See Washington Post, Jan. 9, 1986, at A25; Washington Post,
Mar. 6, 1986, at A25.
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once the blockading force establishes a modicum of credibility
in its enforcement?
If the traditional formulation -- which applies effectiveness
in a strict manner -- is mandatory in every case, then these
issues may be disregarded. However, if minor powers are compelled
to report to economic warfare (even if their capabilities are
insufficient to make the strategy totally effective) then applying
the effectiveness requirement more liberally may yield an appropriate
balance between belligerent obligations to back up their restrictions
on high seas freedoms and neutral obligations to respect those
limitations once a minimal degree of effectiveness is established.
A second aspect of the Iraqi practice which falls short
of the traditional blockade is the means of enforcement, i.e.,
air-to-surface missiles or bombs used against ships without
further warning and without providing for crew safety. This
method of enforcement -- carried out in conjunction with the
exclusion zone — is clearly unlawful under the customary rules
established prior to the World Wars. 215 under a traditional
analysis, Iraq's practices could be dismissed as unlawful on
this basis alone: effectiveness cannot be established by means
violative of other recognized rules. 216
However, the means of enforcement used by Iraq may be
consistent with international law in light of twentieth century
developments. The rationale behind Iraq's strategy resembles
215see supra pp. 32-35 and accompanying notes.
216r. Tucker, supra note 105, at 289.
56

that used by Germany during the World Wars. 217 The Germans
capitalized on their relative strength in submarines; so too
the Iraqis are capitalizing on their air superiority. The German
submarines could not abide by the traditional rules of visit
and search; nor can the Iraqi aircraft. The Germans were targeting
the economic lifelines of Great Britain; the same applies to
Iraq's objective of cutting off Iran's oil exports. 218 Like
Germany, Iraq has declared a zone putting neutrals on notice
of hostile intent; the zone does not bar access to any neutral
port or coast; and the zone has been enforced impartially . 219
From the standpoint of military necessity, Iraq's attempt
to cutoff Iran's oil exports is logical. Iran is economically
dependent on oil exports and Iraq is less capable of sustaining
a long-term ground war. Iraq enjoys air superiority, and Iran
cannot effectively defend against air-to-surface missile or
bombing attacks. From the standpoint of the principle of humanity.
217lraq's strategy also resembles the Allied long-distance
blockade in that it embargoes trade without relying on large
surface forces to operate close-in to hostile territory.
218see supra pp. 18-19 and accompanying notes; N.Y. Times,
Aug. 26, 1985, sec. A, at 4, col. 1. Neutral shipping targeted
by Germany was — for the most part — integrated into the Allied
war effort, if not by political-military affiliations, at least
by cooperation with the administrative controls attending the
long-distance blockade. This is not the case with shipping
in the Persian Gulf. However, the military necessity and logic
behind the Iraqi attacks and the countervailing neutral interests
which are at risk, do not change the analogy to the German
experience. Neutrals lifting Iranian oil, while not integrated
into the Iranian war effort, are trading voluntarily with Iran.
Neutrals arguably could forego part or all of their trade with
Iran and obtain their energy needs from alternate sources.
See sijpra note 188 and accompanying text.
-^1-^ See INTERTANKO, supra note 86, at 3-4, 8.
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the Iraqi strategy limits the geographical scope of the war
and attempts to deter neutrals from entering the exclusion zone.
This reduces the amount of destruction which might occur if
Iraq's intentions were unclear of if it were to engage in unre-
stricted warfare against merchant ships throughout the Persian
Gulf.
These considerations may support the legality of Iraq's
practices depending on how the experiences of the World Wars
are interpreted. If the sea warfare practices of the general
wars are viewed as aberrations — justifiable only in the context
of general warfare, or as reprisals, then the similarity in
logic and circumstance is unpersuasive. If, however, one accepts
the widespread practices of the World Wars as having developed
the law of blockade and exclusion zones, then the similarity
in circumstance seems sufficient to justify the Iraqi practice
(assuming it otherwise meets the requirements for lawful blockades
and exclusion zones). 220
The latter interpretation is more realistic. The development
and proliferation of modern weaponry, the limitations on naval
forces maintained by minor powers, and the perceived advantages
of waging comprehensive economic warfare strategies make it
likely that states will no longer abide by the traditional limits
on sea warfare. The military logic behind these practices makes
their continued use likely. Accordingly, international law.
220see supra pp. 26-29, 32-36 and accompanying text, see also
Studies , su^ra note 10, at 69-74 (Professor Mallison argues
that Germany s practices are justifiable as a claim of right).
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to remain relevant to the decision-making process, must yield
to these new realities of economic warfare at sea.
This does not mean that any practice directed against neutral
vessels is legitimate. The reasonableness of the practice in
light of the circumstances, and the application of traditional
criteria where relevant still inhibit belligerent activity.
However, it does mean that the practices of World Wars (concerning
long-distance blockades and exclusion zones) should be considered
legitimate as claims of right and should serve as a new historical
baseline for assessing current practices.
In summary, the Iraqi practice blends elements of blockade
and exclusion zones to embargo Iranian oil trade. The blockade
comports with traditional requirements, save for that of effective-
ness and means of enforcement.
It is unclear as to how far Iraq must go in order to satisfy
the effectiveness factor. With respect to enforcement, Iraq's
practice is clearly contrary to traditional international law.
However, the experience of the World Wars and the military logic
of Iraq's methods represent developments in the means of warfare
which should be accounted for in emergent customary norms of
international law. If such practices are otherwise reasonable,
i.e., consistent with the underlying principles of the law of
armed conflict and the traditional prescriptions which are relevant





( 2 ) The Context of Limited Warfare
Since 1945, wars have been limited in numbers of participants
and geographic area. The dangers of nuclear war, the strategic
balance of forces, and the concept of collective self-defense
are contributing factors to this limitation. Also, the legal
framework of the United Nations prohibits war except when in
self-defense. 221
Despite the limited nature of war, there has not been a
commensurate limitation on tactics and weapons. The range of
tactics and weaponry has varied depending on the intensity of
the initial force and the magnitude of the conflicting claims. 222
Regarding neutral rights, some scholars maintain that limited
warfare holds belligerents more rigidly to the traditional limits
on economic warfare. Professor D. O'connell states: "This
is because the theory of self-defense which underlies the concept
[of limited war] tends to insulate the high seas and neutral
shipping therein from the state of host i 1 it ies . . . . " 223 -phe
international community (including the major powers) which comprise
neutral claims will not -- in the case of limited war — tolerate
significant interference with commerce. 224 with respect to
claims establishing operational areas. Professor Mallison maintains
that in limited wars:
221 see 2 D. O'connell , supra note 117, at 1094-1100 (self-defense




224studies, supra note 10, at 94-95, 148-49.
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[I]t may be predicted with some confidence that the
interests of neutrals will be protected through their
power and influence as opposed to that of the bel-
ligerents .... If minor belligerents should make claims
to establish such areas, stressing their military
efficiency and necessity, the claims may well be
outweighed by the claims of neutrals against their
use. 22d
The practices of limited war will depend in part on the
availability of weaponry . Professor Mallison states: "The particular
objects of attack which are selected by minor powers should
be influenced by their respective military capability to strike
at them. "226
The nature of limited warfare will depend also on the influence
of neutral states which do not always serve to limit belligerent
activity. On the contrary, neutral powers are often the providers
of weaponry, along with economic, political, and moral support.
This is evident in the Iran-Iraq War. 227 por example, Iraq
has enhanced its military capability by obtaining aircraft and
missiles from France to carry out the tanker war. 228
Neutral states may also be contrained by the impact of
political, diplomatic or military intervention of other neutral
states. This too is evident in the Iran-Iraq War -- both the
United States and Soviet Union have viewed the conflict in the
context of their overall strategic interests, and each has been
225id. at 94-95.
226id. at 148.
227see Committee Print - War in the Gulf, supra note 55, at
9-10; C. Helms, supra note 14, at 176-78 (discussing support
for Iraq provided by various countries).
228see generally supra pp. 13-14 and accompanying notes; Evans





reluctant to do anything that might provoke the other. 229
In summary, the relative capabilities of the belligerents
and the collective interests of neutrals must be considered
and may affect the lawfulness of belligerent practices insofar
as such lawfulness is dependent on the widespread recognition
and acceptance of a given practice. However, there is nothing
intrinsic to limited warfare which precludes practically or
legally the use of comprehensive economic warfare methods, such
as exclusion zones, blockades, or unrestricted attacks on merchant
shipping.
The Iraqi attacks have curtailed high seas freedoms and
caused substantial damage to neutral interests. 230 However,
neutral interests have not been sufficiently threatened to prompt
military, political, or diplomatic intervention -- other than
through U.N. resolutions calling for a fJeaceful settlement . 231
Moreover, the geographic extent of Iraq's practices are limited
and interneutral trade is not directly affected by the Iraqi
exclusion zone or blockade. Accordingly, Iraq's practices are
not unlawful due to the limited warfare context. However,
the overall context of the war is, in part, a function of its
limited nature and is relevant to other aspects of the contextual
229see Evans & Campany, supra note 32, at 40; C. Helms, supra
14, at 176-78.
230see infra pp. 70-72 and accompanying notes.




( 3 ) The Comprehensiveness of the Iran-Iraq War
There is no objective standard for assessing the compre-
hensiveness of war. Instead a subjective assessment of the
national commitments, war aims, weapons employed, willingness
to negotiate, and so forth, is the only reasonable way to analyze
whether a given method is reasonable and proportionate to the
overall dimensions of the conflict.
The Iran-Iraq War is an intense war involving two participants
and occurring within a limited geographical area. It appears
that both parties are using any and all available means to
accomplish their respective aims. The war aims of the Iraqis
are limited essentially to the border dispute over the Shatt
al-Arab and to preventing interference in its internal affairs
by the Iranians. 233 -phe Iranian objectives are more comprehensive:
they seek, inter alia , to overthrow the Baathist regime. 234
Iraq is willing to negotiate . 235 Iran is not. 236 Iran's ground
offensives are characterized by human wave assaults. 237 ^^^e
war is six years old and stalemated. The intensity of the conflict
232rphe limited nature of the Iran-Iraq War is particularly
relevant to the effect on neutral values and world community
reaction to Iraq's practices. See infra pp. 70-79.
233 see supra pp. 10-11 and accompanying notes.
234 see supra pp. 11-12 and accompanying notes.
235 see supra p. 16 and accompanying notes.
23 6Id7
~"^
237Daiy^ supra note 31, at 153-54.
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is seen also in the high casualty levels. 238 under the circum-
stances, it is not unreasonable that Iraq seeks to break the
deadlock by cutting off Iran's economic lifeline.
The tanker war has not significantly changed or widened
the dimensions of the war. At the outset, both parties conducted
hostilities at sea, attacked economic targets, and declared
exclusion zones in the Persian Gulf which do not restrict genuinely
interneutral trade. 239
In summary, the use of the exclusion zones and unrestricted
warfare tactics against merchant vessels which violate the zone
or breach the blockade is proportionate to the dimensions of
the conflict and consistent with the overall intensity of the
war. In this respect, the Iraqi tactics are reasonable.
(4 ) The Imperatives of Military Necessity and Effectiveness
The reasonableness of a given practice is also a function
of its necessity and effectiveness which may be measured in
terms of the military rationale, available alternatives, and
results
.
The military rationale of Iraq's attacks has already been
discussed in light of the traditional prescript ions . 240 m
short, Iraq is capitalizing on its advantage in air power and
is exploiting Iran's military weaknesses and economic vulner-
238 see supra p. 17 and accompanying note.
239 see supra pp. 18-19 and accompanying notes.




The necessity of avoiding traditional limits on attacking
merchant vessels is evident. Like the unrestricted submarine
warfare of the World Wars, the tactic of air-launched missile
attacks precludes adherence to traditional rules. 242
But military necessity is also dependent on whether there
exists any less destructive alternative which will accommodate
the legitimate objectives of the claimant. For Iraq, there
is the obvious alternative of foregoing an embargo of Iran's
trade or limiting its attacks to economic targets which do not
involve third parties.
Some form of economic warfare against Iran is undoubtedly
considered essential to Iraq's leadership since it is far less
able to sustain a long-term ground war. And Iraq's reliance
on more sophisticated weapons is insufficient for a decisive
victory or for forcing negotiations.
Avoiding third party involvement was attempted during the
early stages of the war. This included attacks on oil fields,
pumping stations, refineries, pipelines, railroads, and power
plants. 243 Iran was able to withstand and adapt to the damage
241see id.; Washington Post, Jan. 9, 1986, at 1925 (Iran's
economy is highly dependent on oil exports, 85% of which transit
the Persian Gulf); N.Y. Times, Sep. 23, 1985, sec. A, at 4,
col. 3 (discussing Iran's inability to prevent Iraqi air attacks),
24^ See supra pp. 37-47 and accompanying notes.
243see Stauffer, supra note 73, at 101-02.
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caused by these attacks. 244 rpj^g circumvention measures taken
by Iran to offset their initial losses led to the escalation
that implicated third party interests . 245 professor Stauffer
describes the factors which led to expanded economic warfare
objectives:
Underlying the [tanker war] was an economic and political
inbalance which was slowly working in favor of Iran
and which Iraq felt compelled to rectify.
A second element was the introduction of new military
technology in the form of Super Entendard aircraft
and the Exocet missiles....
Finally, Iraq needed to cripple, if possible, Iran's
oil lifeline in order to offset Iran's overwhelming
superiority on the ground ....[ I Interdiction of Iran's
oil revenues remained the major option for changing
the balance in a war of attrition. 246
Thus, Iraq took the war to the Gulf and commenced its attacks
in earnest against neutral shipping in early 1984. From the
standpoint of military necessity, this strategy cannot be dismissed
as unreasonable or inappropriate.
Though conceding the need to escalate the war against Iran's
oil industry, two outstanding issues remain: could Iraq accomplish
its ends by escalating attacks against export facilities on
land, or could Iraq accomplish its ends by peaceful capture
and condemnation procedures or by destroying vessels only upon
244id. at 103, 105-06, 109-10. For instance, Iran shifted
its export activities from the northern port of Khorramshahr
to Kharg Island and to rail and road transport. Id. at 106.




providing for crew safety?
Iran's primary facility is Kharg Island. It is not clear
whether concentrated and sustained attacks against this and
other Iranian exporting facilities would be successful given
Iraq's military capability. Iraq has carried out repeated attacks
against Kharg Island with only limited success. 247 jt iq ^ot
clear why this strategy has not been pursued more aggressively,
but one possibility is Iraq's belief that Kharg Island is not
destructable given Iraq's military resources and capabilities. 248
Another possibility is Iran's apparent willingness and ability
to alter its export activities to other facilities. 249
Peaceful capture or provision for crew safety are apparently
not within Iraq's military capability. This is a function of
Iraq's naval resources and logistic capabilities. Without a
large surface force, it would be difficult and dangerous to
attempt capture or provision for crew safety. 250 Additionally,
Iraq's access to the Gulf by sea has been effectively cutoff
thus eliminating its naval bases for operation.
247see Washington Post, Sep. 27, 1985, at A32; Washington
Post, Mar. 3, 1986, at A13.
248see Cordesman, The Gulf Crisis and Strategic Interests:
A Military Analysis in American-Arab Affairs, Summer 1984, at
8, 13 (some U.S. specialists consider the Kharg Island facilities
extremely difficult to destroy with tactical aircraft); Washington
Post, Mar. 3, 1986, at A13 (stating that Kharg Island facilities
are difficult to hit and easy to repair).
249 see N.Y. Times, Dec. 30, 1985, sec. D, at 10, col. 2.
250;^s of 1984, Iraq reportedly had only about 35 naval combatants.
Committee Print - War in the Gulf, supra note 55, at 12.
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In terms of effectiveness, Iraqi attacks have had an affect.
They have been executed successfully and have prevented or deterred
a degree of Iran's oil trade. ^^
In summary, Iraq's strategy is a logical adaptation of
its military strengths being employed against Iran's economic
and military vulnerability. It is a logical progression from
previous efforts to cripple Iran's economy. Although not decisive,
the attacks have had some affect.
Less destructive alternatives may be available in the form
of economic targets which do not involve .third parties or through
peaceful capture or destruction only after providing for crew
safety. Although it is difficult to assess objectively the
feasibility of these alternatives, past experience and Iraq's
military capabilities cast doubt on the viability of either
course. If, however, they are reasonably available, Iraq has
an obligation to pursue them in lieu of its present strategy.
(5) The Iraqi Objectives
Iraq's military objectives have been discussed. 2A Arguably,
these objectives are consistent with the principles of military
necessity and humanity. ^A
lAsee Daly, supra note 31, at 158; N.Y. Times, May 24, 1984,
sec. A, at 10, col. 1; Washington post, Jan. 9, 1986, at A25;
Washington Post, Mar. 6, 1986, at A25 (describing the overall
effectivenss of the Iraq attacks).
^^See supra pp. 10-11 and accompanying notes.
^^See supra pp. 2-4 and accompanying text.
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Aside from the military basis for Iraq's attacks on shipping,
some observers suggest that Iraq seeks to "internationalize"
the conflict. ^A That is, if neutral interests are threatened,
they will lend added support to Iraq's cause since they oppose
the spread of Iran's revolution . ^A internationalizing the
conflict could occur directly by attacking neutral ships thus
prompting intervention, or indirectly by provoking Iran into
carrying out its threat to close the Strait of Hormuz which
could also prompt intervention. ^A
If this motive is in fact behind the Iraqi strategy, then
the object of Iraq's attacks is more than Iran's economy, it
is the neutral states themselves. Iraq has no lawful claim
to coerce neutral states into intervention.^^ This would undercut
the lawfulness which might otherwise be ascribed to Iraq's
actions.
However, there is reason to doubt that this political objective
is Iraq's primary motivation. Iraq has been attacking neutral
vessels in earnest since 1984. The GCC states, Europeans, and
superpowers have not intervened or shown a willingness to increase
support for the Iraqis as a direct result of the tanker war.
Iran, on the other hand, is reluctant to carry out its threat
to close the Strait of Hormuz (assuming it has the power to
4Asee Daly, supra note 31, at 156; Committee Print - War
in the Gulf, supra note 55, at 13; N.Y. Times, Jan. 20, 1985,
sec. 4, at 5, col. 1.
5Asee Daly, supra note 31, at 156.
6Asee N.Y. Times, Jan. 20, 1985, sec. 4, at 5, col. 1.
^Ay.N. Charter arts. 1, 2(3)-(4).
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do so) since such a move would cutoff its own exports. Thus,
it is unlikely that "internationalizing" the conflict is more
than an incidental or secondary aspect of Iraq's strategy.
Military strategies often involve political or diplomatic
benefits which are secondary to military necessity and logic.
While such objectives may not be lawful objects of coercion
per se and they should not be dispositive of its legality without
consideration of the military rationale as an adequate basis
for justification. Accordingly, unless internationalizing the
conflict is the underlying rationale for the Iraqi practice,
it does not undercut the lawfulness of the practice.
( 6 ) The Degree of Interference with Neutral Values
Iraq's war against neutral shipping has been costly for
neutrals. Lives and property have been lost. However, ships
entering the exclusion zone are aware of Iraq's intentions and
are engaging in trade with assists Iran, and the exclusion zone
does not interfere with interneutral trade.
Aside from the human and material values directly threatened
by the attacks, other values are also at stake: free navigation
on the high seas and the economic value of oil transiting the
Persian Gulf. At the beginning of the war, Iran and Iraq oil
represented 15% of OPEC production . 8A in 1984, Western European
countries and Japan were importing significant amounts of oil
S^Evans & Campany, supra note 32, at 50.
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from the Persian Gulf.^^ There was much concern in the West
over possible disruption of world oil markets as a result of
Iraq's practices . lOA However, after six years, the aggregate
affect on oil imports and prices has not been great. This has
been, in part, due to world energy supplies and alternate sources
of energy, but it is also due to the relative effects of the
tanker war : ^^
[T]he tanker war is having remarkably little effect
on the Persian Gulf exports through the Strait of
Hormuz...The states in the region have accommodated
the inconvenience caused by the war. In general,
the tankers do not sink when hit, but make it to
port for repairs. The crude on board is usually
saved. .. .Higher insurance premiums have been compensated
for 12A
In addition, there is concern for free navigation. This
underlies neutral claims that their rights are being compromised
by belligerent practices. However, as long as interneutral
trade and the Strait of Hormuz remain open, states appear willing
to tolerate the degree of infringement on high seas freedoms
incurred thus far.
The real danger to neutral interests lies in escalation.
A complete cutoff of oil from the Persian Gulf would pose a
serious threat to neutral interests . ^ 3A This could occur if
either party conducts widespread attacks on shipping outside
the exclusion zone or if the war were to spread to other moderate
^^Committee Print - War in the Gulf, supra note 55, at 34-35.
lOAgvans & Campany, supra note 32, at 40.
ll^committee Print - War in the Gulf, supra note 55, at 5;
Washington Post, Mar. 6, 1986, at A25.
^^Acommittee Print - War in the Gulf, supra note 55, at 35.
13Asee j^. at 13-17, 35-38.
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Gulf states. I'^A Along these lines, the United States has repeatedly
threatened to intervene if the Strait of Hormuz is closed. 15A
In summary, neutrals have interests at stake in the Persian
Gulf and these interests are threatened by the war. However,
the current level of hostilities at sea does not rise to the
level in which the neutral interests are vitally threatened
or to a point where interference with neutral states clearly
outweigh the interests of the belligerents.
(7 ) The Reaction of the Community of States
The consent of nations is central to the development of
customary international law. International reaction to the
Iraqi attacks on shipping is therefore a critical factor in
assessing its lawfulness. It is also a difficult factor to
assess: Nations rarely react with unanimity; their positions
14Aiphe concern over escalation is reflected in the actions
taken in the UN Security Council. See S.C. Res. 540, 38 U.N. SCOR
(2493^ mtg.) at 6, U.N. Doc. S/INF/39 (1983) [hereinafter cited
as Res. 540]; S.C. Res. 552, 39 U.N. SCOR (2546^^ mtg.) at 15,
U.N. DOC. S/INF/40 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Res. 552].
These resolutions call for peaceful settlement of the Iran-Iraq
dispute and respect for free navigation in the Persian Gulf
by all states. Resolution 552 was passed in reaction to Iranian
attacks outside the exclusion zones -- this development was
condemned by the Security Council, in part, because it threatened
to escalate the war. Iraqi attacks on shipping within the exclusion
zone or pursuant to its blockade have not been specifically
condemned in the U.N.
^^^committee Print - War in the Gulf, supra note 55, at 8-9.
U.S. resolve to intervene has fallen-off somewhat in light of
its reduced reliance on Persian Gulf oil, preoccupation with
other trouble-spots, and the perception that the GCC states
can prevent closure of the strait of Hormuz. See N.Y. Times,




are often ambiguous, inconsistent, and motivated, in part, by
non-legal considerations. These difficulties are evident in
the reaction to Iraq's practices in the Persian Gulf.
Iraq has specifically invoked international law in defense
of its attacks on shipping. Iraq's Foreign Minister, Tariq
Aziz, has stated that the purpose behind its exclusion zone
and blockade "is to make the Iranians incapable of continuing
the war.... We just want to cut off all cooperation that provides
them with cash."^^^ In the Iraqi view, ships entering Iranian
ports are functionally non-neutral since they are feeding the
Iranian economy. In a letter to the UN Security Council, Iraq's
representative stated that his country was acting in self-defense
in attacking Iranian oil exports:
In view of the persistence of the Iranian Government
in continuing its aggression and in refusing to [settle
the dispute] with Iraq by peaceful means, Iraq has
no alternative but to pursue its policy of defending
itself on the basis of those provisions of international
law which authorize a State which is a party to an
armed conflict to impose a blockade on the ports of
the adversary State, within a precisely defined zone
made known to all, in order to induce that State to
accept peace. . . .Accordingly, ships [entering the exclusion
zone and violating the blockade] forfeit their neutral
character since they violate a right unequivocally
conferred by international law....l7A
In 1983, the Security Council passed Resolution 540 which
called for a peaceful settlement of the dispute and affirmed
"the right of free navigation and commerce in international
waters," and called upon all States to respect this right by
16An.y. Times, Jan. 20, 1985, sec. 4, at 5, col. 1.
I'^^u.N. DOC. S/16972, Feb. 20, 1985, letter from the Permanent
Representative of Iraq to the Secretary-General.
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ceasing "immediately all hostilities in the region of the Gulf,
including all sea lanes, navigable waterways, harbour works,
terminals .... and all por t s . . . . " l^A This resolution did not
distinguish between Iraqi and Iranian attacks on neutral ships.
Iraq has accepted the principles embodied in Resolution
540 and will abide by them when Iran agrees to negotiate and
allows free access to Iraq's ports. ^^A
The regional states in the Persian Gulf have been generally
supportive of Iraq.^OA They have also distinguished between
Iraqi attacks occurring inside the exclusion zone and those
occurring outside the zone -- perpetrated principally by iran.^lA
This was reflected in the Security Council debate during 1984
on the tanker war after Iran allegedly attacked ships outside
the exclusion zones in international waters and in territorial
waters of GCC states (Kuwait and Saudi Arabia). 22A This was
viewed as a dangerous escalation which prompted the GCC states
to initiate Security Council action resulting in Resolution
552. 23A This resolution states, in part: "[Alttacks should
ISA^es^ 540, supra note 14A, at para. 3.
l^^u.N. DOC. A/38/560 S/161/20 (Annex), Nov. 3, 1983, letter
from the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the Secretary-General.
20Asee Committee Print - War in the Gulf, supra note 55,
at 28-33. Regional states in this context means the members
of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) which include Saudi Arabia,
Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates
(UAE)
.
2lAsee U.N. Doc. S/16574, May 21, 1984, letter from the GCC
states to the Security Council complaining of Iran's attacks
on Kuwaiti and Saudi Arabian merchant ships; see also 21 U.N.
Chronicle No. 5 5-8 (1984) (summarizing the positions taken
by the various GCC states in the UN debate over Res. 552).
22Asee supra note 21A.
23ARes. 552, supra note 14A.
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cease forthwith and that there should be no interference with
ships enroute to and from States that are not parties to the
host ilit ies . . . . ''24A jt also specifically condemns the attacks
on Kuwaiti and Saudi Arabian vessels. 25A
During the debate over Resolution 552, some states saw
a difference between the Iraqi and Iranian attacks. For example,
the representative from Oman stated:
The Iran-Iraq War has taken a new and dangerous turn....
[The Iranian attacks on Kuwaiti and Saudi tankers]
were a materialization of Iran's threats to expand
the scope of the war .... [Oman] considers [such acts]
dangerous precedent, contrary to the laws of navigation
and a flagrant violation of the principles of inter-
national law and the United Nations Charter.
Iraq, being in a declared state of war vith Iran,
blockaded Iranian ports and attacked vessels and tankers
sailing to and from Iranian ports. However, this
in no way justifies Iran's attacks on tankers and
vessels proceeding to and from the ports of the Arab
States members [sic] of the [GCC], which do not wish
to be dragged into the- conflict . 26A
Likewise, the representative of the League of Arab States
took a similar position:
It cannot be denied that [the Kuwaiti and Saudi Arabian
ships] were in no way military; they were not partici-
pating in the war; they were outside the combat zone....
Iraq, a founding member of the League, has declared
its compliance with .. .resolution 540 ( 1983) ...
.
[Whereas]
the Iranian Government has rejected [resolution 540]....
24ARes. 552, supra note 14A, at para. 5.
25Aid. at para. 4.
26Au.N. DOC. S/PV.2543, May 29, 1984, at 31.
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[T]he recent escalation tends to add a new dimension
to the conflict through the blockading of the ports
of States that are not parties to the conflict. 27A
Among the Security council members, the Netherlands somewhat
ambivalently echoed a similar point of view, but went on to
endorse the call for respect of free navigation in the Gulf
by all states. The U.N. Chronicle paraphrased the Netherland's
representative:
As to the legal aspects, under international law,
belligerents ^ may take measures' to restrict shipping
to and from ports of the other belligerents. Such
measures did, of necessity, affect the right of third
States under whose flag such shipping was conducted.
But indiscriminate attacks against merchant shipping
"in whatever part of the Gulf' fell outside the scope
of permissible use of armed force.
Freedom of navigation was a right that should be respected
equally by all concerned parties in the Gulf.^SA
The French representative took a position, which suggests
a degree of recognition for the distinction between attacks
occurring outside the exclusion zone and those occurring inside.
Paraphrasing the French representative, the U.N. Chronicle reported:
[T]he attacks in question [against Kuwaiti and Saudi
Arabian ships] had taken place against nonbelligerent
States in an area outside of the zone of conflict
and, in some cases, under the direct sovereignty of
some of them. GCC States had established a clear
distinction between attacks against two of them in
their own sovereign domain and acts of war resulting
from the tragic Iran-Iraq conflict. At issue were
two different matters: on the one hand, the conflict
and, on the other hand, " the totally unwarranted violations
2'7Au.N. DOC. S/PV.2541, May 25, 1984, at 36, 38, 39-40.
28A21 U.N. Chronicle, No. 5 , supra note 28A, at 8-9.
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of the most legitimate rights and interests of third
parties ' . 29A
The media noted the apparent distinction between Iraqi
and Iranian practices. The New York Times reported that "delegates
from several countries, including the United States, contended
that Iran's attacks ... were different from Iraqi attacks near
Iran's oil port.... The Iraqi attacks were treated in the Council
as being within the limits of acceptable behavior .. .while Iran's
bombardments were not."-^^^
Other states did not agree with the distinction and maintained
that all attacks on shipping are illegal. For instance, the
representative from Panama stated:
My country makes an urgent appeal to the parties
to the conflict to refrain from further hostile acts
against Panamanian vessels and to respect and implement
scrupulously the principles of international law enshrining
the principles of freedom of navigation....
We appeal to both sides to abide by the fundamental
norms of humanitarian international law, which oblige
respect for... the lives and physical well-being of
those not participating in hostilities -- and this
would certainly apply to Panamanian vessels ... .Conse-
quently, we demand that all parties show respect for
our vessels. 31A
Representatives from India, Pakistan, Great Britain, and
Malta expressed concern over the Iranian attacks, but also
maintained that respect for free navigation of both parties
was required -- implying that they did not countenance Iraqi
29 Aid. at 9.
30An.y. Times, Jun . 2, 1984, sec. 1, at 1, col. 5.
3lAu.N. DOC. S/PV.2542, May 25, 1984, at 26.
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attacks on neutral shipping. ^2A
In the debates surrounding the 1984 Security Council action,
the United States supported the GCC draft resolution (552),
but declined to state unequivocally that it accepted Iraqi conduct
in the Persian Gulf. The U.S. representative's remarks included
the following:
The war not only continues but expands posing an increasing
threat to the stability of the region. . . . The acceleration
of attacks against shipping in the Gulf, particularly
attacks against shipping going into or out of the
ports of non-belligerent States, not only threatens
those States, but indirectly poses a potential threat
to [the world's economic recovery ].... ^^A
Outside the structure of the United Nations, the world has
responded with a general sense of complacency. States have
allowed their ships to enter the Gulf; they have not intervened
or organized a collective military response; nor have they initiated
significant legal, political, or diplomatic efforts to stop
the Iraqi attacks. The main concern is over the danger of
escalation.
Perhaps the reasons for the lack of a strong response (outside
the United Nations) is the relative importance of the conflict.
Outside the Persian Gulf area, no states's vital interests are
directly and imminently threatened.
The GCC states have been supportive of Iraq, but not to
the point of involving themselves in the hostilities. The super-
32Asee Press release summaries of statements , U.N. Doc. SC/4643,
Jun. 1, 1984, at Takes 6, 9, 10; 21 U.N. Chronicle, No. 5 , supra
note 28A, at 10.
33A21 U.N. Chronicle, No. 5 , supra note 28A, at 8.
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powers have also reacted with a degree of support for Iraq,
but are apparently satisfied to see each side exhaust the resources
of the other -- so long as the conflict remains confined to
its current dimensions . ^'^A
In addition, the overall strategic importance of the Gulf
has -- for the time being -- receded in priority; this is partly
due to the reduced reliance by the West on oil exports coming
out of the Gulf area.35A
The reaction of the world community produces no clear consensus
on whether Iraq's actions are lawful under international law.
Arguments have been made both ways based on the positions taken
by various states in the U.N. Security Council. Additionally,
there has been no clear response outside the U.N. to the Iraqi
practice in terms of its legitimacy under international law.
B. Conclusions
Iraq is on the defensive, the morale of its troops shaky,
and its economy strained. However, Iraq does have an advantage
in sophisticated military equipment.
Economic targeting has been used strategically by each
side since the early stages of the conflict. Iraq, in an effort
to break the deadlock, declared the exclusion zone and blockade
34Asee Evans &' Campany, supra note 32, at 40; see also Inter-
national Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) (London) Strategic
Survey 1984-1985 67, 70-71 (1985) (assessing the impact of the
war on the superpowers).
35Asee Washington Post, Feb. 13, 1986, at Al.
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of Kharg Island. Functionally, these two devices serve a common
purpose — interdiction of Iran's oil exports.
In principle Iraq's attacks against neutral shipping —
carried out in conjunction with a declared blockade and exclusion
zone -- is legally supportable under international law. In
practice, however, the Iraqi strategy thus far has failed to
meet the customary requirement of effectiveness. This conclusion
is based on a subjective assessment of the effectiveness criteria
and stems from the fact that Iraq has not, on a sustained basis
severely curtailed Iran's oil exports. Iran has been able to
continue much of its export activity; ships continue to enter
the zone in substantial numbers and Iran's economic lifeline
remains largely in tact. Under these circumstances, it is reason-
able to conclude that Iraq's blockade has not been effectively
enforced.
Iraq's practices are also objectionable if less destructive
alternatives are reasonably available. For instance, if Iraq
can sustain attacks against Iraqi targets of economic significance,
or if peaceful stoppage and capture of ships lifting Iran's
oil is practicable, then such methods involving less interference
with or destruction of neutral values would be required in lieu
of attacking neutral ships.
The legality of Iraq's practices, assuming that less coercive
alternatives are not feasible and that Iraq has the capability
to effectively pursue its present strategy, requires an assessment
of the contextual criteria discussed above.
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The World Wars established the strategic value of comprehensive
economic warfare measures enforced by long-distance blockades,
sizeable war zones, and unrestricted warfare against neutral
shipping within such zones. These methods comport with the
basic principle of military necessity since they further the
logical objectives of stopping economic intercourse with the
enemy and utilize the most efficient military means for carrying
out such objectives; the principle of humanity is met since
neutrals are duly warned and deterred, contact between opposing
forces is minimized, and the area of hostilities defined and
thereby limited.
Economic warfare measures of the World Wars were not aberra-
tions based on reprisal and counter-reprisal; they signified
emergent customary practices based on the technological realities
of modern warfare and the expanded nature of economic warfare
objectives
.
The Iraqi method of enforcing its blockade is analogous
to the strategies used during the World Wars and bears particular
similarity to Germany's submarine warfare against neutral shipping
going to and from Great Britain. The principles of military
necessity and humanity may be met by Iraq in the same manner
they were in the World War analogues.
The Iraqis have complied with the basic traditional require-
ments in establishing an exclusion zone and blockade by openly
declaring such measures and impartially enforcing them. The
means of enforcement is reasonable given Iraq's insufficient
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surface naval forces and its inability to comply with the traditional
requirements for visit, search and capture of vessels entering
the zone or violating the blockade.
The limited warfare context of Iraq's practices means that
neutral values may take on a greater significance than in a
general war setting. However, the limited warfare criterion
does not necessarily preclude tactics such as those employed
by Iraq. Iraq's strategy is being employed in a limited area
which does not interfere in genuinely interneutral trade. Iraq's
practices reflect their limited military capability and are
directed against lawful military objectives. Neutral interests
are not so threatened as to clearly outweigh the rights of the
Iraqis to attempt a cutoff of Iran's oil trade.
In terms of comprehensiveness, the Iran-Iraq War is an
intense war involving two participants, fought in a limited
geographic area. Each belligerent has committed a significant
portion of its national resources to the conflict. The threat
to Iraq goes to its very existence; Iran seeks to overthrow
the Baathist Government and install one based on its revolutionary
principles. The Iraqi practices are proportionate to the overall
dimensions and intensity of the war.
The imperatives of military necessity and effectiveness
support the legitimacy of Iraq's war against neutral shipping
in the Gulf. The early economic warfare initiatives carried
out against Iran were insufficient. Destroying Kharg Island
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is a possible option, but Iraq's ability to accomplish this
is questionable. Its efforts thus far to shutdown the facility
have been unsuccessful.
In resorting to attacks on neutral vessels, Iraq may be
required legally to first pursue less destructive options:
peaceful capture or providing for crew safety; but here too,
Iraq's capabilities to pursue such options is questionable.
In terms of effectiveness, Iraq has been successful in
carrying out attacks. The failure lies in the overall affect
of the attacks given their consistency, intensity, and the con-
comitant affect on the willingness of neutral vessels to breach
the blockade and exclusion zone.
The Iraqi attacks have interfered with neutral values:
property and lives have been lost. However, the world energy
market has not been signiTicant ly disrupted and no neutral state
has been provoked into direct intervention. In short, neutral
states have tolerated the Iraqi attacks despite their rhetorical
objections. The threat lies not in the level of destruction
of neutral values encountered to date, rather in the potential
for escalation.
Iraq's objectives may include political considerations
of internationalizing the conflict. However, this seems to
be, at best, a secondary consideration which should not undercut
the legality of their practices.
The reaction of the international community has been ambiva-
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lent -- no definitive conclusion can be drawn from the reaction
of states to the Iraqi attacks. Arguments have been made in
the United Nations opposing and implicitly supporting the Iraqi
attacks within the exclusion zone. Resolution 540 calls for
respect for free navigation by all parties and thus signifies
a refusal to expressly recognize the legitimacy of the Iraqi
attacks. Juxtaposed to this is the relatively greater concern
shown for Iranian attacks outside the exclusion zones.
These considerations taken as a whole lead to the conclusion
that Iraq's strategy is supportable in principle under inter-
national law when considered in its contemporary context. However,
the implementation of Iraq's strategy fails to meet the traditional
requirement of effectiveness. Moreover, if less coercive alterna-
tives are reasonably available to Iraq, they must be pursued
in lieu of Iraq's present course which is relatively destructive
of neutral values. The viability of such alternatives is a
function of Iraq's military capability which is limited in terms
of naval power.
C. The Iranian Practices
The Iranian attacks are analyzed as reprisals for Iraq's
warfare against neutral shipping and as retaliatory measures
directed against the various GCC states who support Iraq's war
effort. The visit and search operations are analyzed as a claim
of right. Both tactics are discussed under the traditional
and contextual criteria applied to the Iraqi practices.
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( 1 ) The Degree of Compliance with Traditional Legal Criteria
Iran has indicated that its attacks on neutral shipping
are -- at least in part -- in reprisal for attacks in kind by
Iraq.^^A Reprisal action refers to "acts directed against the
enemy which are conceded to be generally unlawful, but which
constitute an authorized reaction to prior unlawful acts of
the enemy for the purpose of deterring repetition of such ante-
cedent acts."37A Justifying Iran's attacks on the basis of
reprisal assumes the underlying illegality of Iraq's attacks
and accrual of a right of reprisal to Iran.^^A ^he legitimacy
of reprisal action depends on the claimant's adherence to the
traditional limitations of proportionality, target, and manner
of the reprisal. 3^^
Proportionality refers to a standard of reasonableness
under the circumstances -- that is, action designed to reasonably
affect the enemy's expectations on the costs and benefits associated
36Asee McLean's Mag., May 28, 1984, at 30. Iran's motive
is not 1 imited to reprisal against Iraq -- Iran's leadership
has also indicated a general objective of denying others use
of Persian Gulf sea-lanes. See N.Y. Times, Jun. 12, 1984, sec.
A, at 12, col. 3.
37Am. McDougal & F. Feliciano, supra note 6, at 679.
38Acustomarily , the right of reprisal accrues to the injured
state. See 2 Oppenheim-Lauterpacht , supra note 4, at sec. 33.
It is not clear whether Iraqi's attacks on neutrals, if illegal,
creates a right of reprisal for Iran. See R. Tucker, supra
note 105, at 257 n.28. For purposes of this analysis it is
assumed that Iran has a right to conduct trade with neutrals,
thus imparting a right of reprisal. Moreover, Iran has an
independent basis for reprisal to the extent that its ships
have been attacked. See , e.g. , Time, May 28, 1984, at 51.
^^^See M. McDougal & F. Feliciano, supra note 6, at 682.
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with its continued resort to the initial illegal conduct. ^OA
Iran's attacks on neutral ships arguably meets this requirement:
Iran's stated purpose is to stop the Iraqi attacks against shipping.
Iran's tactics are similar to those employed by Iraq and have
not exceeded the Iraqi practice in either number or intensity . ^1^
Traditionally, targets of reprisal are persons and property
of the enemy bearing some reasonable relation to the acts sought
to be deterred. 42A Iran's practice fails this requirement since
its object is interneutral commerce. '^^A interfering with neutral
trade may be part of reprisal action, but traditionally entails
targeting neutral trade with the offending belligerent . ^"^^
With respect to the manner of Iran's reprisal i.e., attacks
on unarmed neutral merchant vessels without warning or provision
for crew safety, this too fails to meet traditional limitations
on sea warfare. '^^A while reprisals are, by definition, resort
to normally unlawful measures, this does not alleviate the need
40Aid.
^l^See appendix II.
42Asee R. Tucker, supra note 105, at 152; 2 Oppenheim-Lauterpacht,
supra note 4, at sec. 37; M . McDougal & F. Feliciano, supra
note 6, at 684.
4 3Asee McLean's Mag., May 28, 1984, at 30. Creating potitical
pressure on Iraq to cease its attacks by threatening the interests
of other Gulf states is inconsistent with the customary limits
on lawful reprisal objectives.
^^^^2 Oppenheim-Lauterpacht, supra note 4, at sec. 319. For
example, Germany's submarine warfare and the Allied long-distance
blockades affected, in the first instance, neutral rights, but
were ultimately directed against the enemy since it was commerce
with the enemy that was the target of reprisal. Id .
"^^^Destruction of neutral merchant vessels is traditionally
limited to cases of persistent refusal to stop or active resistance
to visit and search — and only then upon placing the crew and
papers in a place of safety. Id. at sec. 194a; R. Tucker, supra
note 105, at 350.
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for reasonableness. In this case, resorting to indiscriminate
attacks on unarmed merchant ships without warning, an exclusion
zone, or provision for crew safety, is unreasonable and the
customary prescriptions concerning the protection of neutral
merchant ships should apply. ^^^
Iran could also argue that its attacks on shipping constitute
a lawful reprisal or retaliation against the various GCC states
for their active support of Iraq.^^A Retaliatory measures directed
against the activities of neutrals which have violated their
duties as neutrals is recognized under international law.^^A
This belligerent right is subject to international law principles
i
concerning reprisal in time of peace which allows for retaliatory
action so long as it is roughly proportionate to the neutral's
offense. 49A The level of force employed is subject to the general
standards of reasonableness, military necessity, and minimum
destruction of human and material values.
In this case, it would be reasonable and perhaps necessary
for Iran to take retaliatory action against persons or property
engaged in or related to assistance being rendered to Iraq.
46A<phe arguments, discussed in section IV. B. 3., above, con-
cerning emergent norms of sea warfare regarding threatment of
neutral vessels and economic warfare are inapplicable in this
instance since Iran's attacks are directed at international
trade and are not part of an economic warfare strategy.
^^^See generally IISS (London), supra note 34A, at 67-68
(1985); Committee Print - War in the Gulf, supra note 55, at
28-33 (discussing GCC-State support for Iraq).
48A see R. Tucker, supra note 105, at 261-62; 2 Oppenheim-
Lauterpacht, supra note 4, at sec. 359.
^^^See R. Tucker, supra note 105, at 261-62.
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However, indiscriminate attacks on merchant vessels outside
any exclusion zone or blockade effort goes beyond such standards.
Moreover, Iran has an alternative in its visit and search cap-
ability which is both less coercive and more closely tailored
to the conduct it seeks to prevent. ^^A This is a recognized
prerogative under customary international law.^lA visiting
and searching ships suspected of assisting Iraq is proportionate
to the threat, arguably necessary from a military standpoint,
and in accord with notions of humanity.
In summary, Iran may have a right of reprisal against Iraq
for the latter's attacks on neutral ships. Resorting to a reprisal
requires adherence to standards of proportionality, appropriate
targets, and manner of attack. Iran's attacks may be proportionate,
but are directed against unlawful targets and are carried out
in an unreasonable manner.
Iran's attacks on shipping cannot be justified as a reprisal
or retaliatory action against the GCC states because the targets
of attacks include interneutral shipping. Moreover, visit and
search operations are a viable alternative for action against
shipping which assists Iraq.
SOAsee supra pp. 20-23 (concerning Iran's ability to pursue
this option). The availability of alternatives -- short of
reprisal — for securing redress for misconduct is a procedural
requirement preceding reprisals. M. McDougal & F. Feliciano,
supra note 6, at 688-89.
^l^See supra pp. 29-32 and accompanying notes.
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( 2 ) The Context of Limited Warfare
As with the Iraqi practices, there is nothing intrinsic
to limited warfare which undercuts the reasonableness and lawfulness
of a given method. However, balancing neutral rights is an
important aspect of assessing lawfulness and this is affected
by the limited scope of the conflict.
The Iranian attacks -- although similar to those carried
out by Iraq -- entails greater involvement of neutral interests.
First, the geographic scope of the attacks is larger and affects
interneutral shipping lanes throughout the Persian Gulf; secondly,
the scope of the economic activity under attack is largely affecting
oil trade throughout the Gulf area. The Iranian attacks are
not part of a defined strategy of economic warfare against Iraq
or any other state — there is no comprehensive embargo, blockade,
or exclusion zone.
These considerations which distinguish the Iranian from
the Iraqi attacks, are evident in the international reaction
to the former's pract ices . ^^A Generally, the international
community has been less tolerant of the Iranian attacks. ^^^
The GCC states in particular have reacted sharply to Iran's
attacks; they have sponsored UN Security council action condemning
Iran and have resorted to force in repelling Iran's air forces




from their territorial waters. ^'^^ The United States and a few
other Western nations have also expressed heightened concern
for the Iranian practice, viewing it as escalatory and a threat
to Middle East oil supplies. ^^A
The relative importance of neutral interests suggests that
the limited warfare context reinforces the traditional prescriptions
on sea warfare that prohibits Iran's attacks.
The traditional recognition afforded visit and search operations
is not affected by the limited warfare context. Neutral interests
are interfered with, but not threatened with destruction. The
military necessity which arguably underlies this activity outweighs
neutral inconvenience, and international reaction to this activity
reinforces this conclusion. There has been no general condemnation
of Iran for this practice. Assuming it is reasonably employed
within the traditional limitations, use of visit and search
in a limited war context is a lawful belligerent prerogative.
(3 ) The Comprehensiveness of the Iran-Iraq War
Iranian attacks on shipping are proportionate to the overall
dimensions of the conflict. However, the attacks involve inter-
neutral commerce and are occurring throughout the Gulf. The
54Asee supra pp. 74-75; N.Y. Times, Jun. 12, 1984, sec. A,
at 12, col. 3 (citing Saudi Arabia's shooting down of an Iranian
F-4 Phantom); IISS (London), supra note 34A, at 67-69 (discussing
the defensive posture of the GCC states to Iranian provocations).
55Asee supra pp. 76-78 and accompanying notes; see generally
Committee Print - War in the Gulf, supra note 55, at chs . 2,5




Iranian practice is escalatory in terms of geographic scope
and the level of destruction of neutral values.
Iran's visit and search operations are also proportionate
and are occurring within the same geographic area as the attacks.
This practice does not involve indiscriminate destruction of
neutral ships and is more directly related to activities which
constitute a military threat to Iran.
(4
)
The Imperatives of Military Necessity and Effectiveness
Iran's attacks on shipping are not militarily necessary
or effective. Although the ships under attack could conceivably
by carrying contraband or oil exports for Iraq, there has been
no apparent effort to limit the attacks to these activities.
Iran's attacks are not calculated to capitalize on a military
strength to the direct disadvantage of the enemy. In short,
Iran's practices are not part of an economic warfare strategy
and do not diminish the enemy's military capability.
The lack of any military necessity for the attacks is also
demonstrated by the availability of visit and search operations
which offer both an effective and arguably necessary means of
preventing shipping activity that does assist the enemy.
( 5) The Iranian Objectives
Iran's objective of pursuing a reprisal action for alleged
illegalities by Iraq is supportable (assuming the initial illegality
of Iraq's attacks), but as indicated above, the targets of their
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attacks are not the enemy — they are ships engaged in international
trade. As such they are not proper objects of reprisal. Carrying
out the attacks for the political purpose of affecting the policies
of the GCC and other Arab states is not a legitimate object
of reprisal.
Similarly, while some retaliatory action may be warranted
to prevent outside assistance from reaching Iraq, indiscriminate
attacks on interneutral trade for the purpose of putting political
pressure on the GCC states is not lawful.
( 6
)
The Degree of Interference with Neutral Values
As in the cases of the Iraqi attacks, nationals of neutral
states have been killed and property belonging to neutral states
has been lost as a result of the Iranian attacks. The difference
between the two practices lies in the geographic scope and extent
of neutral involvement. Iran's attacks extend beyond the exclusion
zones declared by the belligerents, are not part of an embargo
strategy, and have included the territorial waters of neutral
states. The degree of interference with neutral values by Iran
is reflected in the reaction of those states affected. ^^^
(7) The Reaction of the Community of States
The international reaction to Iran's practices culminated
in U.N. Security Council Resolution 552. ^^^ Iran's attacks
56Asee supra pp. 72-79 and accompanying notes.
^^^See supra n.l4a and pp. 74-75 and accompanying notes
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are not perceived as part of an economic warfare strategy directed
against Iraq. Instead, Iran's actions are seen by most as pro-
vocations directed against neutral states. ^^^
Outside the United Nations, the defensive measures taken
by the GCC states further illustrates rejection of Iran's prac-
tices. 59A Saudi Arabia, in particular, has demonstrated its
resolve to forceably counter Iranian attacks directed against
its ships or in its territorial waters. ^^^ The United States
also has expressed a willingness to back Saudi (and other GCC
states) defense through military aid and, if necessary, military
intervention. ^^^
With respect to Iran's visit and search practices there
has been general acquiescence. Most states appear willing to
concede that Iran has a right to conduct reasonable searches
on neutral ships for contraband that might be bound for Iraq.^^A
However, some states have shown a reluctance to trust Iran under
such circumstances . 63A
^QAsee supra pp. 72-79 and accompanying notes; IISS (London),
supra note 34A, at 67-69 (discussing how the GCC states view
Iran s revolution as a threat to their security).
59Asee IISS (London), supra note 34A, at 67-69.
60Asee N.Y. Times, Jun . 12, 1984, sec. A, at 12, col. 3.
6lAsee Time Mag., Jun. 4, 1984, at 30-31.
62Asee N.Y. Times, Jan. 14, 1986, sec. A, at 1, col. 6 (Reagan
Administration states that Iran's visit and search of SS President
Taylor may have been within Iran's rights).
^^^Some states (including the U.S.) have expressed concern
that Iran will go beyond lawful conduct in carrying out visits
on merchant ships. This arises in part from Iran's sponsorship
of terrorism and hostage-taking, and its avowed hostility toward
the West. See Washington Post, Nov. 11, 1985, at A25; N.Y. Times,
Jan. 15, 1986, sec. A, at 1, col. 2; Washington Post, May 15,




Analyzing the Iranian attacks and visit and search practices
under the various contextual criteria does not alter the assessments
of Iran's practices under the traditional prescriptions of inter-
national law. Iran may have grounds for a reprisal action against
Iraq and for retaliatory action to prevent GCC states from assisting
Iraq, but engaging in attacks on neutral vessels does not constitute
a legitimate means of pursuing these claims. Reasonable visit
and search procedures, on the other hand, are a recognized bel-
ligerent right and can be utilized to prevent contraband from
reaching Iraq.
In the context of limited warfare, the rights of neutral
states must be considered and weighed against the belligerent
rights. The Iranian attacks threaten neutral interests — to
a greater degree than those carried out by Iraq -- since they
involve interneutral trade and extend to sea-lanes throughout
the Persian Gulf. There is no commensurate military need to
justify this degree of interference with neutral shipping.
The attacks are also excessive as a means of preventing
outside assistance from reaching Iraq. The targets of Iran's
attacks are not limited to those engaged in or reasonably suspected
of being engaged in such activity.
The Iranian attacks, as a military tactic, are not dispro-
portionate to the overall dimensions and intensity of the conflict.
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However, the attacks are escalatory in terms of geographic scope
and in the degree of implication of neutral values.
The imperatives of military necessity and effectiveness
do not support the legality of Iran's attacks either in terms
of a reprisal against Iraq or as a retaliatory action against
the GCC states. As a reprisal, the practice is not necessary
or effective since it is not directed at Iraq. It is not necessary
as an action against the GCC states since a viable alternative
exists in visit and search operations; nor is it effective,
since the attacks are not limited to or directed specifically
at shipping carrying contraband to Iraq.
Iran's objectives vis-a-vis Iraq appear to be more political
than military. By attacking Iraq's supporters they may hope
to create pressure on Iraq to stop its attacks on shipping and
deter future assistance for Iraq. This motivation further undercuts
the legitimacy of Iran's attacks on shipping.
Iran's attacks have caused damage to neutral values. This
damage serves no legitimate military ends since it is not directed
against Iraq nor specifically at GCC shipping which assists
Iraq.
The international community has rejected Iran's claim to
respond to Iraq's attacks by attacking interneutral trade.
This is reflected in U.N. Resolution 540, by the defense measures
taken by the GCC states, and by the stated intentions and concerns
of Western states. On the other hand, states have implicitly
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conceded the essential lawfulness of Iran's visit and search
practices, although reserving the right to respond to any excesses.
These contextual factors, taken both individually and as
a whole, suggest that the customary prescriptions of international
law pertaining to Iran's practices remain valid under the contem-
porary circumstances of the Iran-Iraq War. Iran's attacks are
unlawful; however, its exercise of reasonable visit and searches






21 May: Iraqi aircraft slightlv damaged the Panamanian
bulk carrier Louise I iust outside the northern Iranian port
of Bandar Khomeini.
19 October: An Iraq missile damaged the Liberian bulk
carrier Al Tajdar near Bandar Khomeini, and the Panamanian bulk
carrier Motra was bombed and seriously damaged. Both were later
repaired. 25 October: Iraqi missiles set the Indian
bulk carrier Rashi Vish Wamitra ablaze near Bandar Khomeini,
causing heavy damage.
1982
11 January: Two Iraqi missiles set fire to the Panamanian
freighter Success, causing her to be abandoned. The Greek bulk
carrier Annabella was damaged by a mine near Bandar Khomeini.
14 February: The 16,000-ton Iranian tanker Mokran was
seriously damaged by mines laid by the Iraqis near the northern
port near Bandar Mahshahr.
30 May: The Turkish tinker Atlas was seriously damaged
during an Iraqi bomb attack on Kharg Island.
6 June: The Greek 26,000-ton bulk carrier Good Luck was
damaged by Iraqi missiles off Bandar Khomeini. Three crewmen
were killed. 9 August: Iraqi missiles sank the 15,000-ton
Greek freighter Lition Bride near Bandar Khomeini and damaged
the 16,000-ton South Korean bulk carrier Sanbow Banner beyond
repair. Eight crewmen were missing and one killed aboard the
Sanbow Banner . 4 September: The Turkish bulk carrier Mar
Transporter was damaged beyond repair by a direct Iraqi missile
hit on her engine room near Bandar Khomeini. She was sailing
in a ten-ship convoy escorted by Iranian naval vessels.
11 September: The Greek freighter Evangelia S. struck
an Iraqi mine at the entrance to Bandar Khomeini harbor, was
grounded and abandoned.
21 November: The Indian bulk carrier Archana was slightly
damaged by an Iraqi missile attack at the Iranian port of Bushire.
18 December: Iraqi missile set fire to the Greek tanker




2 January: Iraqi aircraft set fire to the Sinapore freighter
Eastern and the Orient Horizon of Liberia, causing them to run
aground while in a convoy from Bandar Khomeini.
15 May: The Panamanian oil tanker Pan Oceanic Sane was
set ablaze by an Iraqi missile attack and abandoned in the Bandar
Khomeini channel.
25 May: Iraqi aircraft slightly damaged the Panamanian





31 May: The Indian bulk carrier Atj Pritt was seriously
damaged by Iraqi missiles near Bandar Khomeini.
31 October: The Greek freighter Avra was set ablaze by
Iraqi missiles near Bandar Khomeini as she sailed in a convoy
escorted by Iranian naval vessels.
21 November: An Iraqi missile sank the 13,000-ton Greek
bulk carrier Ant igoni near Bandar Khomeini as she sailed in
a convoy escorted by Iranian naval vessels.
8 December: The 16,000-ton Greek bulk carrier lapetus
was attacked by Iraqi missiles off Bandar Khomeini and abandoned,
later to be repaired.
1984




Neptune , Skaros , and City of Rio—was attacked by Iraqi aircraft
near Bandar Khomeini. The Breeze and Skaros were set afire
by missiles and lost. The City of Rio struck a mine and grounded,
and the Neptune was set ablaze but was not extensively damaged.
16 February: An Iraqi missile extensively damaged the
Liberian freighter Al Tariq in the Iranian port of Bushire.
1 March: In an attack on a 15-ship convoy sailing between
Bushire and Bandar Khomeini, the Indian bulk carrier Apj Ankiba
was sunk by an Iraqi missile. The 19,000-ton British bulk carrier
Charming was set ablaze and grounded after an Iraqi missile
hit her superstructure. The Turkish freighter Sema-G was set
ablaze and abandoned. Two crewmen were killed.
27 March: In its first operational use by the Iraqi Air
Force, a Super Etendard jet fighter fired an Exocet missile
at the 85,000-ton Greek tanker Filikon L. , carrying 80,000 tons
of crude oil from Kuwait, south of Kharg Island: the Iraqi
pilot had apparently assumed the tanker was carrying Iranian
oil. The missile tore a gash in the hull, slightly damaged
the star- board side of the bow, slop tank and number 4 tank,
but failed to detonate. Two hundred tons of oil leaked out.
U.S. experts later defused the missile.
29 March: The 16,000-ton Greek freighter lapetos was set
afire by an Iraqi missile and abandoned at the head of the Persian
Gulf.
18 April: An Iraqi missile slightly damaged the 52,000-ton
Panamanian tanker Rover Star while sailing in ballast to Kharg
Island.
25 April: The 357,000-ton Saudi tanker Saf ina-Al-Arab ,
carrying 340,000 tons of Iranian crude, was seriously damaged
by an Iraqi missile south of Kharg Island. The missile blew
a 240-square-foot hole in the starboard side, bending the hull
plates inward. It caused an explosion and fire in number 11
starboard tank which spread to number 9 and 10. The fire, which
raged for two days, burned 10,000 tons of oil. The ship was





27 April: Iraqi missiles slightly damaged the 179,000-ton
Liberian freighter Sea Eagle near Bandar Khomeini.
7 May: The 118,000-ton Saudi tanker Al-Ahood , loaded with
114,000 tons of Iranian crude, was set ablaze by an Iraqi missile
near Kharg Island. The fire, which took five days to extinguish,
burned 34,000 tons of oil. The missile struck the accomodation
section near the engine room and caused extensive damage, described
as follows on 28 May by a London Times reporter: It blew "a
hole the size of a London bus along the waterline when an Iraqi
missile exploded .... The superstructure has been twisted back
and outwards over the stern and the crew's quarters have simply
melted down as if they were made of plastic rather than iron.
The gash on the starboard side is so deep that you can see daylight
through it." One crewman was lost.
13 May: An Iraqi missile slightly damaged the 69,000-ton
Iranian tanker Tabr iz , fully loaded with Iranian oil, south
of Kharg Island.
14 May: An Iraqi missile set fire to the 62,000-ton Panamanian
tanker Esperanza II while sailing in ballast to Kharg Island.
The engine room and accomodation section was completely burned
out
.
18 May: An Iraqi missile sank the 17,000-ton Panamanian
bulk carrier Fidelity near the Iranian port of Bushire.
24 May: An Iraqi missile narrowly missed the Arizona
,
a fullyloaded 140,000-ton Panamanian tanker, south of Kharg
Island.
25 May: The 19,000-ton Liberian bulk carrier Savoy Dean
was hit by an Iraqi missile in the north of the Persian Gulf.
3 June: The 153,000-ton Turkish tanker Buyuk Hun , sailing
in ballast to Kharg Island, was damaged by an Iraqi missile
50 miles south of the island. The missile hit the accomodation
section, killing three crewmen. The tanker was towed away by
an Iranian tugboat.
7 June: An Iraqi mine blew a hole below the waterline
on the side of the Liberian freighter Dashaki near the Strait
of Hormuz. The ship had dropped off cargo at Bandar Abbas and
was heading for Saudi Arabia.
24 June: The 152,000-ton Greek tanker Alexander the Great ,
fully loaded with Iranian oil, was slightly damaged by an Iraqi
missile at Kharg Island. The missile penetrated an oil tank
but failed to explode.
27 June: The Swiss-owned, Liber ian-registered 260,000-ton
tanker Tiburon , loaded with 250,000 tons of Iranian oil, was
damaged by Iraqi missile southeast of Kharg Island. The missile
hit the engine room and 100-foot flames spread to the accomodation
section. The fire and subsequent explosions destroyed the entire
superstructure and caused the funnel to collapse. Two days
after the attack, the ship was wallowing with only three feet
of hull above water. Salvage tugboats saved the oil by extinguishing





to Bahrain after eight crewmen were killed and three seriously
injured
.
I July: The 6,200-ton South Korean cargo vessel Won jn-Ho
was damaged by an Iraqi missile while on her way to Bandar Khomeini.
The 13,000-ton Greek freighter Alexander-Pyo was heavily damaged
by another Iraqi missile during the same attack. Two crewmen
were killed and four injured.
7 August: An Iraqi missile slightly damaged the 123,000-ton
Greek tanker Friendship L. fully loaded with Iranian oil, 39
miles south of Kharg Island. The missile pierced an oil tank
and caused a minor fire, which spread to the engine room and
accomodation section but was quickly extinguished.
24 August: The 53,000-ton Cypriot tanker Amethyst , carrying
50,000 tons of Iranian crude, was damaged by an Iraqi missile
south of Kharg Island. It was saved from sinking by tugboats
which brought the blaze under control. The fire, which spread
from the engine room to the accomodation section and some oil
tanks, raged for 24 hours. One crewman was lost.
II September: Fully-loaded Liberian registered, Norwegian-owned
251,000-ton tanker St. Tobias slightly damaged by an Iraqi Exocet,
50 miles south of Kharg Island. The missile blew a 6-foot hole
on the ship's starboard side, and started a fire that was quickly
extinguished. The oil cargo remained intact, and the tanker
continued to Abu Dhabi under her own power for repairs.
12 September: The 500-ton German supply ship Seatrans
21 , which had been slightly damaged on 25 May, was sunk by an
Iraqi missile 50 miles south of Kharg Island. Six crewmen were
killed.
8 October: The Liber ian-reg istered 285,000-ton tanker
World Knight was struck by Iraqi missile southwest of Kharg
Island. The damage was heavy. The missile wrecked the engine
room and set fire to the crew quarters. Seven crewmen were
killed and five badly injured. The tanker was on her way to
Kharg Island.
15 October: The fully-loaded Iranian 219,000-ton tanker
Si vand was hit by Iraqi missiles and set afire after she left
the Kharg Island oil terminal.
3 December: The 386,000-ton Cypriot tanker Minotaur was
damaged by an Iraqi missile on her way to the Kharg Island
oil terminal. The engine room was set ablaze, but the fire
was under control five hours after the hit.
9 December: An Iraqi warplane fired an Exocet missile
into the Bahamian-registered, 163,000-ton tanker B.T. Investor ,
on her way to the Kharg Island oil terminal. The missile punched
a hole in a port tank, just above the waterline, igniting no
fire and causing negligible damage. No crewmen were hurt.
15 December: The 241,000-ton Greek tanker Ninemia was
heavily damaged by two Iraqi missiles on her way to Kharg Island.
The first missile set the tanker's engine room afire, killing





to the port of Bushire.
17 December: The 21,000-ton Greek cargo ship Aegis Cosmic
was hit on a port side cargo hold, apparently by an Iraqi missile,
85 miles north of Bahrain. The vessel, which was only slightly
damaged and whose crew suffered no casualties, continued her
journey.
21 December: The 53,000-ton Liber ian-registered tanker
Magnolia was hit by an Iraqi missile 31 miles south of Kharg
Island, and two of her crewmen were killed. The Norwegian super-
tanker Thorshavet
, loaded with 230,000 tons of Iranian oil,
was heavily damaged by another Iraqi missile during the same
attack. Her 26 crewmen abandoned ship.
IRANIAN ATTACKS
1980
3 April: Three foreign freighters were sunk and two others
damaged by Iranian shells in the Iranian port of Khorramshahr
during an exchange of fire with attacking Iraqi forces. At
least 20 crewmen were killed.
1984
3 April: According to a report to the Indian Parliament,
Iranian shelling set fire to the Indian freighter Varuna .
13 May: In the first reported attack by Iranian aircraft
on commercial shipping, the 80,000-ton Kuwaiti tanker Umm al-Casbah
,
carrying 77,000 tons of Kuwaiti oil, was slightly damaged by
Iranian rockets south of Kuwait. After being observed by a
spotter plane, an Iranian F-4 jet fighter dived and fired two
rockets. Both hit the deck and landed overboard.
14 May: The 30,000-ton Kuwaiti tanker Bahrah
,
sailing
in ballast to Kuwait, was damaged by Iranian aircraft. Two
F-4s fired five rockets at close range; two hit the starboard
side, blowing a massive hole. One rocket hit numbers 4 and
5 wing tanks which subsequently caught fire. Two crewmen were
injured before the fire was extinguished eight hours later.
The ship continued to Kuwait.
16 May: An Iranian rocket attack slightly damaged the
215,000-ton Saudi tanker Yanbu Pride
,
carrying 120,000 tons
of Saudi crude, within Saudi territorial waters near the port
of Jubail. Out of the five rockets fired by the two F-4s, two
hit the vessel and caused fire and explosion. Fire started
in the starboard hold, but was quickly extinguished. prior
to the firing, the F-4s circled the tanker for identification.
24 May: Two Iranian F-4s damaged the 29,000-ton Liberian
tanker Chemical Venture
,
sailing in ballast in Saudi waters,
near the port of Jubail. The Iranian rockets hit the vessel
in the middle of the superstructure, causing fire in the acco-
dation section and the bridge. The fire was extinguished but





10 June: An Iranian F-4 attacked the 295,000-ton Kuwaiti
tanker Kazimah , sailing in ballast east of Qatar. The plane
dropped bombs, which missed, then proceeded to fire rockets.
The damage was slight and there were no injuries.
5 July: Iranian jets slightly damaged a Japanese-owned
super- tanker, the Liber ian-registered Pr imrose . It was hit
by two rockets, but continued at full speed.
10 July: In what appeared as a case of mistaken identification,
an Iranian F-4 attacked the 133,000-ton British tanker British
Renown while sailing to pick up crude from the tanker Tiburon
which had been struck by an Iraqi missile 27 June. Following
the appearance of a spotter plane, an F-4 fired two rockets
at the tanker. One bounced off the deck, and the other hit
oil-loading equipment, igniting a small fire which was quickly
extinguished. The attack took place in international waters




SPECIAL WARNING No. 67.
PERSIAN GULF - STRAIT OF HORMUZ - GULF OF OMAN.
1. U.S. Mariners are advised to exercise extreme caution when
transiting the waters in the Persian Gulf which are becoming
increasingly dangerous due to continued attacks on vessels outside
the military zones declared by Iran and Iraq.
2. In view of recent Iranian visit, search, and in some cases
seizure of vessels of third countries within the Persian Gulf,
Strait of Hormuz, and the Gulf of Oman, U.S. Mariners are advised
to exercise extreme caution and to be alert to possible hazardous
conditions, including hostile actions, when transiting these
waters.
3. The Iranian Government has issued guidelines for the naviga-
tional safety of merchant shipping in the Persian Gulf, the
relevant portions of which are as follows:
After transiting the Strait of Hormuz, merchant ships
sailing to
non-Iranian ports should pass 12 miles south of Abu
Musa Island;
12 miles south of Sirri Island; south of Cable Bank
Light; 12 miles
south of Farsi Island; thence west of a line connecting
the points
27-55N. 49-53E. and 29-10-N. 49-12E.; thereafter south
of the line
29-lON. as far as 48-40E.
All Iranian coastal waters are war zones.
All transportation of cargo to Iraqi ports is prohibited.
The Iranian Government will bear no responsibility
for merchant
ships failing to comply with the above instructions.
4. Deep draft shipping should be aware of shoal waters south
of Farsi Island.
5. The Iraqi Government has stated that the area north of
29-30N. is a prohibited war zone. It has warned that it will
attack a 11 vessels appearing within a zone believed to be north
and east of a line connecting the following points:
29- 30N. 48-30E., 29-25N., 49-09E, 29-23N. 49-47E., 28-23N.
51-OOE. The Iraqi Government has further warned that all tankers
dock ing at Kharg Island regardless of nationality are targets
for the Iraqi Air Force.
6. In view of continued hostilities between Iran and Iraq
and recent acts of interference or hostility against vessels
of third countries, U.S. Mariners are advised, until further
notice, to avoid Iranian or Iraqi ports and coastal waters and






7. The publication of this notice is solely for the purpose
of advising U.S. Mariners of information relevant to navigational
safety and in no way constitutes a legal recognition by the
United States of validity [sic] of any foreign rule, regulation,
or proclamation so published.
8. Special Warning numbers 53, 62, 65, and 66 are canceled.
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